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1. INTRODUCTION
The  production  of  most  goods  is  increasingly  organized  along  global  value  chains
(GVCs),  in which  different stages  of  the  production  process  are  fragmented  across  countries.
This worldwide phenomenon has attracted a lot of attention among policy makers, business
leaders, trade economists and academic researchers alike. Consequently, a large academic
literature has emerged to investigate how the possibility to fragment production processes across
borders may affect the volume, pattern and consequences of international trade (see, e.g., Feenstra
and Hanson 1996; Yi 2003; Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg 2008). However, GVCs are
undeservingly rarely considered in theoretical and empirical analysis of trade policy (for relevant
discussion see also Blanchard, Bown and Johnson 2016).  In this paper we take a step toward
filling these voids by exploring effects of domestic export promotion policies on foreign countries`
export which emerge due to backward and forward linkages inside GVCs via trade in
intermediates.
The main issue in both policy and academic discussion of export promotion policies and
particularly export subsidies is whether they have significant negative impacts on foreign
countries. Earlier strategic trade policy literature (Spencer and Brander 1983; Brander and Spenser
1985; To 1994) conclude that in the world of imperfect competition and without trade in
intermediates, export subsidies can help domestic firms to capture market shares of foreign firms
in international markets thereby pointing to negative effect of domestic export incentives on
foreign export. In this paper we refer to this effect as to negative “competition for market share”
effect.
However, once the shift towards GVCs production is considered and linkages within and
across value chains must be taken into account, determining the net effects of government export
policies become more complicated. In particular, sectoral or firm-specific government policies in
GVCs world can benefit GVC as a whole including foreign firms/plants, their workers and local
communities (Hoekman 2015). Several theoretical papers (Spencer and Jones 1991; Bernhofen
1997; Ishikawa and Spencer 1998; Sheldon, Pick, and McCorriston 2001; Lee and Wong 2005)
attempted to shed light on this issue by studying export promotion policies` effects in the presence
of trade in intermediates (the main attribute of GVCs production). In general, all these studies
conclude that under certain theoretical assumptions, in the presence of trade in intermediates,
export promotion policies, particularly export subsidies, can lead to profit/rent-shifting to foreign
producers within common GVCs.
In this study, summarizing this literature, we distinguish between three types of positive
effects of domestic export promotion measures on foreign countries` producers and in particular
their export, which emerge due to backward and forward linkages inside GVCs via trade in
intermediates (we also name them external effects of export incentives along with negative
“competition for market share” effect). First one, we name it positive backward linkages` effect,
emerges as a consequence of domestic export incentive for final-good/processed intermediate-
good producers. This incentive stimulates demand increase for foreign intermediate good, which
is imported to be used in production of subsidized domestic final/higher-tier processed
intermediate good. Second one, we name it positive forward linkages` effect, emerges as a
consequence of domestic export incentive for intermediate-good producers. This incentive leads
to the cost reduction of produced abroad final/higher-tier intermediate good (which is exported to
third countries), which uses subsidized imported intermediate good in its production. Finally, third
one, we name it  positive “spider” complementarity effect, emerges as a consequence of domestic
export incentive for intermediate good used in the assembly of final/higher-tier intermediate good
abroad (which can be exported to third countries). Due to simultaneous action of positive backward
and forward linkages` effects outlined above, this export incentive stimulates demand increase for
complementary foreign intermediate good also used in the assembly of that final/higher-tier
intermediate good.
We build a framework which describes and summarizes these effects separately for final
and intermediate goods` foreign exports depending on the type of good (final versus intermediate)
targeted  by  domestic  export  incentive.  Our  framework  distinguishes  between  primary  and
processed intermediate goods and, at least partially, counts for spillover effects of domestic export
incentives for other than targeted by incentive domestic goods and their subsequent effects on
foreign producers and their export activities.
Next, we provide empirical test of the presence of the outlined effects in the BRICs1 bloc`s
trade in recent years (2009-2014) in accordance to our framework. BRIC countries are very
suitable for this project, firstly, due to their rather aggressive export promotion policies in recent
years (see, e.g., Evenett 2015) and, secondly, due to their rather high inclusion into the world`s
GVCs and also their rather high interdependence via GVCs. In our empirical test we particularly
study how export incentives implemented in one of the BRIC countries affect exports (more
specifically, export shares in the world markets) of the other three BRIC countries. More
concretely, we study effects of one of the BRIC countries` export incentives disaggregated at HS
two-digit industries on the other three BRIC countries` export shares disaggregated at HS six-digit
industries. This allows us to count for GVCs linkages inside two-digit HS industries. In order to
1 The ‘BRIC’ is an acronym for the four largest and most dynamic emerging economies – Brazil, Russia, India and
China. The four countries, Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC) held their first summit in 2009. At the end of 2010,
South Africa was officially invited to join the group (henceforth called ‘BRICS’) and attended the third summit in
2011. I do not include South Africa in the analysis because its share in the BRICS export is very small – only 3% of
the BRICS` cumulative export in 2010-2014 according to the data of International Trade Centre of WTO and UN
(http://www.trademap.org/tradestat/Product_SelCountry_TS.aspx).
test our theoretical propositions more explicitly we further separate effects of BRICs export
incentives on each other`s export of final, primary intermediate and processed intermediate goods.
We also distinguish between external effects of export incentives targeted at final, primary
intermediate and processed intermediate goods. Finally, we empirically separate positive
backward linkages` effect, which only emerges in bilateral trade flows, from other external effects
of export incentives.
Our empirical analysis utilizes a factor content of trade methodology developed by Romalis
(2004). Romalis examines whether countries that are abundant in a factor of production capture
larger U.S. import shares in industries relatively intensive in that factor. This paper takes the factor
content specification and augments it with export policy measures to test how export policies
inside and outside the country affect its export. The broad finding is that both domestic and foreign
export policies are significant determinants of export. Data for the analysis mainly comes from
Global Trade Alert, UN COMTRADE and UNCTAD.
Our empirical investigations provide rather strong evidence that external effects of export
incentives can be negative or positive alike. Importantly, overall this evidence reflects each BRICs
country`s role in the world`s and each other’s GVCs. Our empirical results enable us to draw
several broad conclusions. First, we find that on more aggregate levels negative effects of  BRICs
export incentives for each other’s` exports still prevail which signifies that even in the world of
GVCs export promotion policies are more harmful than beneficial for foreign countries. Second,
we find that majority of positive external effects of export incentives within BRIC bloc emerge
between China and India. Finally, our separate test for positive backward linkages` effects enables
us to conclude that most positive backward linkages` effects within BRIC bloc emerge for the
export of primary intermediates.
This paper draws from a strand of theoretical literature that found profit/rent-shifting
effects from domestic export promotion policies to foreign producers in the presence of trade in
intermediates (Spencer and Jones 1991; Bernhofen 1997; Ishikawa and Spencer 1998; Sheldon,
Pick, and McCorriston 2001; Lee and Wong 2005). More specifically, this study contributes to
this literature, firstly, by summarizing and clarifying the effects of domestic export promotion
policies on foreign export, which emerge due to backward and forward linkages inside GVCs via
trade in intermediates. Secondly, despite the prominence of the theory on the effects of domestic
export promotion policies on foreign producers, to the best of our knowledge there is no single
study which would empirically examine these effects. In this paper, we take a step toward bridging
this gap between theory and evidence.
This paper also directly relates to recently emerging literature on trade policies in the age
of global value chains (Balwin and Venables 2013; Gawande, Hoekman, Cui 2015; Blanchard,
Bown and Johnson 2016). Finally, though in recent years BRIC countries have become salient
players in the world trade, only few trade research papers (see, e.g., Cakir and Kabundi (2013) and
Iapadre and Tajoli (2014)) have attempted to analyze the BRICs in terms of their trade patterns,
developing integration, and potential bloc-wide cohesiveness. This study attempts to enrich this
scant literature.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents theoretical framework of the study.
Section 3 introduces our empirical case, in particular, it discusses BRICs recent export promotion
policies and their current involvement in GVCs. Section 4 describes empirical strategy. Section 5
presents and discusses empirical results. Finally, section 6 offers conclusions.
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Though the perfectly competitive model of international trade says that, in general, export
subsidies reduce home country welfare, in the world of imperfect competition by
subsidizing/promoting export countries might increase their domestic welfare if they win in
competition for profitable international markets. In their seminal paper Spencer and Brander
(1983) has shown that in imperfectly competitive international markets, a government, which has
the objective of maximizing domestic welfare, may have an incentive to subsidize research and
development activities of domestic firms in industries in which they compete with foreign firms
for international markets. In particular, they conclude that in the case of subsidy domestic welfare
is improved by the capture of a greater share of the output of rent-earning industries, although the
subsidy-ridden non-cooperative international equilibrium is jointly suboptimal. In a companion
paper Brander and Spencer (1985) further present the analysis based on imperfect competition (in
particular, they incorporate Cournot duopoly into a one-period “third market” model) to explain
why export subsidies might be attractive policies from a domestic point of view. They found that
governments` optimal policy is to subsidize exports because export subsidy improves the relative
position of the domestic firm in non-cooperative rivalries with other firms, and allow it to expand
its market share. To (1994) goes forward and examines export policy using a two-period model of
oligopolistic competition with switching costs. He concludes: “When governments and firms are
patient, consumers are impatient, and switching costs are significant, exporting countries will
subsidize exports in the first period. A subsidy helps capture market share which is valuable to the
government in terms of both second-period profits and second-period tax revenues” (To 1994, p.
100). All these studies come to a general conclusion that in markets with imperfect competition
export incentives (subsidies, in particular) can benefit implemented countries and harm affected
(rival) foreign countries if they help subsidized domestic firms to capture market shares of foreign
firms in international markets. In other words domestic export promotion measures enhance
domestic export (lead to the increase of domestic export shares in the world markets in affected
industries) but negatively affect export of foreign rivals (i.e. the respective export shares of affected
foreign countries fall). In the rest of the paper, we refer to the latter effect (i.e. negative effect of
export incentive targeted at domestic final-good producers for foreign export of the same final
good) as to negative “competition for market share” effect.
In strategic trade policy models outlined above, only a final product is considered and only
primary factors are used in the production process. However, in the real world most industries use
in production not only primary factors but also intermediate inputs. Furthermore, the rising
international trade in intermediate inputs reflects the increasing importance of GVCs when
production processes span multiple countries, with each country specializing in particular stages
of a good’s production sequence (Costinot, Vogel, and Wang 2013). These facts have been
recognized in academic literature and there have been a number of papers analyzing various issues
of interaction between trade in intermediate inputs and trade policies. Given that in this study we
focus on the effects of domestic export incentives on foreign countries` export (we refer to them
as to external effects of export incentives), we mainly refer to the relevant studies within this
broader literature. In order to make analysis more straightforward, we also distinguish between
export incentives targeted at either final or intermediate goods.
The seminal paper for the case of external effects of export incentives aiming at domestic
final-good producers in the presence of intermediate trade is Ishikawa and Spencer (1998).
Ishikawa and Spencer (1998), under assumption of Cournot competition, conclude that in
vertically related industry an export subsidy aimed at shifting rents from foreign to domestic final-
good producers may also shift rents to oligopolistic foreign suppliers of intermediate inputs.
Bernhofen (1997), assuming that intermediate good is supplied by a foreign monopolist, similarly
finds that export subsidy on domestic final-good producer can cause a vertical rent-shifting from
domestic downstream producer to foreign upstream supplier. In the empirical context of this study
these theoretical predictions imply that:
Proposition 1: Domestic export incentive (e.g. subsidy) implemented in country A for final/higher-
tier intermediate product X can induce foreign export of intermediate input I from country B to
country A used in production of subsidized final/higher-tier intermediate product X in country A
if foreign suppliers of intermediate input I are oligopolistic or monopolistic. In the rest of the paper
we refer to this effect as to positive backward linkages` effect.
Though theoretical literature on export promotion policies aiming at intermediate-good producers
is somewhat less straightforward for the context of this study, it still allows us to make relevant
conclusions. For example, in their influential paper Spencer and Jones (1991) study the market
structure where, in the home country A, there is a vertically integrated firm controlling exports of
both an intermediate and a final good. This firm competes in a foreign country B with a firm that
produces the final good and has the option of either importing the intermediate good or producing
it at higher cost. In the case of trade in intermediate and final goods, if in home country A profit
margins are higher for trade in the former, Spencer and Jones show that the optimal policy of
country A government is a tax on exports of the final good in order to shift toward trade in the
intermediate good. Such a policy results in that low-cost vertically integrated manufacturer in
country A exports an intermediate product, lowering the costs of a foreign rival producer of final
goods in country B thereby stimulating country B export of respective final goods. For the
empirical context of our study, these conclusions imply that there can be circumstances when a
government can be interested in establishing export promotion policy targeting at intermediate-
good producers, which in turn will benefit producers in foreign countries who import these
intermediate inputs for their production of final goods.
Similarly, Lee and Wong (2005) examine the use of export subsidy to encourage domestic
production of an intermediate input or a final product in a model with international rivalry between
firms in two countries. Lee and Wong paper is a simple extension of a well-known international
duopoly model considered in the literature to study the use of export subsidies. They consider two
countries, labeled home and foreign, and two industries in each country: one for a final good for
consumption, and another for an intermediate input, which is used exclusively in the production
of the final good. Trade between the two countries in the intermediate product is allowed, while
outputs of the final good are sold in the rest of the world. Though Lee and Wong emphasize that
they do not want to claim wide applicability of their results because of some simplifying
assumptions they made, in the context of our study some of their conclusions are useful. In
particular, according to their model, under certain theoretical assumptions, domestic subsidy for
intermediate-input producer leads to the increase of output and profit of foreign producer of final
good, which uses respective intermediate input in her production.
Sheldon, Pick, and McCorriston (2001) examine the interaction between export subsidies
and profit-shifting in a vertical production system, where each stage of production downstream
from agriculture may be characterized by imperfect competition. Their focus is on comparing the
profit-shifting effect for the case where an export subsidy can be targeted either at a foreign final
processed good  (i.e. foreign export subsidy for final-good producers) or at domestic unprocessed
agricultural commodity (i.e. domestic export subsidy for unprocessed agricultural commodity
producers), where the latter enters the production process for an intermediate good subsequently
used in production of the final processed good. According to their model, domestic export subsidy
to the unprocessed agricultural commodity may have greater profit-shifting effects in the final
goods` market than a downstream foreign export subsidy. In addition, both types of subsidy result
in profits being shifted from the home to the foreign upstream processing firm.
Summarizing these theoretical studies, we arrive at our second proposition:
Proposition 2: Domestic export incentive (e.g. subsidy) implemented in country A for intermediate
product I can positively affect country B`s export of final/higher-tier intermediate good X which
uses intermediate product I imported from country A in its production. In the rest of the paper we
refer to this effect as to positive forward linkages` effect.
The models discussed above assume production process of the ‘snake’ type, i.e. when the product
moves through a vertical production process with value being added as a sequence of operations
are performed. The operations form a continuum indexed z ∈ [0,  1]  where  z  =  0  is  the  most
upstream and z = 1 is the most downstream, the output of which is the final good (Baldwin and
Venables (2013)). However, Baldwin and Venables (2013) argue that most production processes
are complex mixtures of the “snake” and “spider” chain types where “spider” is a production
process where separate parts (intermediate goods) are assembled into the final good (or higher-tier
intermediate good). Parts can be produced in different countries. The choices of location of part-
makers and assembler are based on cost-minimization considerations.
Export incentive (e.g. subsidy) implemented in country A, which reduces production costs
of one of the parts (intermediate good) used in “spider” production process/assembly of
final/higher-tier intermediate good in country B,  should positively affect country`s B
production/export of the final/higher-tier intermediate assembled good, in accordance to positive
forward linkages` effect outlined above. It can be further suggested that in accordance to positive
backward linkages` effect outlined above there can be positive effects from that export subsidy to
foreign producers of other parts (intermediate goods) used in the assembly of the same
final/higher-tier intermediate good due to the increased production/export of the latter. This logic
brings us to the third proposition:
Proposition 3: Assuming that production process of final/higher-tier intermediate good X is
“spider” type and that the assembly of the good X in country A requires two intermediate goods
Y and Z produced in country B and C, respectively, it can be suggested that domestic export
incentive (e.g. subsidy) implemented in country B for intermediate product Y can positively affect
export of intermediate good Z from country C to country A.  In the rest of the paper we refer to
this effect as to positive “spider” complementarity effect.
Finally, we should count for spillover effects of domestic export incentives for related domestic
goods (not targeted by incentives directly) and their subsequent effects for foreign producers and
their export activities, in particular. Firstly, export incentive targeted at domestic final/processed
intermediate goods can positively affect export activities of domestic suppliers of intermediate
inputs used in production of domestic subsidized final/processed intermediate goods. In particular,
increased demand for their goods from local producers can enhance their productivity and export
propensity. This proposition can be further supported by a recent study of Baldwin and Venables
(2015) who develop a model in which the interaction of forward and backward linkages determines
the range of goods and of parts that are produced in a developing economy. Based on this model
they show that support for final goods producers can increase the range of parts produced,
broadening the industrial base. These positive spillovers for domestic upstream producers can lead
to negative “competition for market share” effect for the export of foreign upstream producers of
the same intermediates. We name this effect as indirect negative backward linkages` “competition
for market share” effect. On the other hand, the same export incentive can push domestic suppliers
of intermediates to supply their goods to local subsidized producers instead of exporting them.
This effect can be especially strong in case of vertical integration between domestic producers of
final and intermediate goods. This can lead to positive “competition for market share” effect for
the export of foreign upstream producers of the same intermediates. We name this effect as indirect
positive backward linkages` “competition for market share” effect.
Secondly, export incentives targeted at domestic primary/processed intermediate goods can
negatively affect domestic producers of final/higher-tier processed intermediate goods who use
domestic subsidized intermediates in their production. More specifically, this negative effect can
arise if export incentive make it more profitable for domestic producers of subsidized intermediates
to export them than to sell to local producers of higher-tier intermediate or final goods. This can
lead to positive “competition for market share” effect for the export of foreign producers of the
same final/higher-tier processed intermediate goods. We name this effect as indirect positive
forward linkages` “competition for market share” effect.
Thirdly, if two countries say A and B export two complementary final goods say X and Y,
then export subsidy targeted at  final good X/Y in country A/B can positively affect export of final
good Y/X in country B/A. We name this effect as indirect positive “complementary final goods”
effect.
After building theoretical background of our framework, we move to its summary. This
also requires outlining its basic assumptions. In particular, in this study, we distinguish between
primary and processed intermediate goods and final goods. We further assume that primary
intermediate good can be used in production of both processed intermediate or final good and
processed intermediate good can be used in production of final or higher-tier processed
intermediate good. We also assume that negative “competition for market share” effect can emerge
between domestic and foreign producers of any type of goods (final good, primary or processed
intermediate good) at horizontal level. That is domestic export subsidy targeted at domestic
producers of either final or primary intermediate or processed intermediate good can help them to
capture market shares in international markets of foreign producers of the same final or primary
intermediate or processed intermediate good, respectively.
Based on theoretical propositions and assumptions made above, on Figure 1 we present
theoretical framework, which serves as a base for our empirical analysis.
Figure 1 Theoretical framework: Summary of external effects of export incentives
Country B export of final goods Country B export of primary
intermediate goods
Country B export of processed
intermediate goods
Export incentive aimed at final-good producers in country A
Negative “competition for market share”
effect
Indirect positive “complementary final
goods” effect
Positive backward linkages` effect
(Proposition 1)
Indirect negative backward linkages`
“competition for market share” effect
Indirect positive backward linkages`
“competition for market share” effect
Positive backward linkages` effect
(Proposition 1)
Indirect negative backward linkages`
“competition for market share” effect
Indirect positive backward linkages`
“competition for market share” effect
Export incentive aimed at primary intermediate-good producers in country A
Positive forward linkages` effect
(Proposition 2)
Indirect positive forward linkages`
“competition for market share” effect
Negative “competition for market share”
effect
Positive “spider” complementarity effect
(Proposition 3)
Positive forward linkages` effect
(Proposition 2)
Positive “spider” complementarity effect
(Proposition 3)
Indirect positive forward linkages`
“competition for market share” effect
Export incentive aimed at processed intermediate-good producers in country A
Positive forward linkages` effect
(Proposition 2)
Indirect positive forward linkages`
“competition for market share” effect
Positive backward linkages` effect
(Proposition 1)
Positive “spider” complementarity effect
(Proposition 3)
Indirect negative backward linkages`
“competition for market share” effect
Indirect positive backward linkages`
“competition for market share” effect
Negative “competition for market share”
effect
Positive forward linkages` effect
(Proposition 2)
Positive backward linkages` effect
(Proposition 1)
Positive “spider” complementarity effect
(Proposition 3)
Indirect negative backward linkages`
“competition for market share” effect
Indirect positive backward linkages`
“competition for market share” effect
Indirect positive forward linkages`
“competition for market share” effect
Note: Direct effects are denoted by bold and italic while indirect effects – by italic.
3. BRIC COUNTRIES AS A CASE STUDY OF EFFECTS OF DOMESTIC EXPORT
PROMOTION POLICIES ON FOREIGN COUNTRIES` EXPORT
As was already noted in introduction, BRIC countries are very suitable for this project, firstly, due
to their rather aggressive export promotion policies in recent years (see, e.g., Evenett 2015) and,
secondly, due to their rather high inclusion into the word` GVCs and also their high and growing
interdependence via GVCs.  Below we discuss these issues in more detail.
3.1. Export promotion policies in the BRIC countries in recent years
In a recent Global Trade Alert (GTA) report of the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
authored by Evenett (2015), it has been shown that since the Global Crisis began three of the
BRICS - Brazil, India, and China - have introduced a large number of additional incentives to
inflate exports (i.e. export incentives). In this section we briefly overview recent BRICs` export
promotion policies according to GTA database. This database includes trade measures
implemented from 2006 to present but does not necessarily contain all implemented measures. In
Table 1 we summarize basic statistics of export incentives which have been implemented in the
BRIC countries in 2006-2014 according to GTA database.
Table 1 Summary statistics of export incentives implemented in BRIC countries in 2006-2014*
Country Number of export
incentives
Number of affected
tariff lines (four-
digit HS 2007)
including
repetitions**
Number of affected
tariff lines (four-
digit HS 2007)
excluding
repetitions**
Number of affected
countries including
repetitions**
Number of affected
countries excluding
repetitions**
Brazil 9 2980 854 1131 208
Russia 3 354 354 110 110
India 59 5311 1107 5242 212
China 15 1037 660 1181 194
Note: 1) *We consider only export incentives which, by GTA definition, are “implemented and almost certainly discriminate against foreign
commercial interests” (in GTA classification they are marked by red color); export incentives for services are not included; 2) **Repetitions mean
that certain industries/countries could be affected by several export incentives. Inclusion of repetitions is important because it helps to capture the
magnitude of the effects of export incentives for industries and third countries, respectively.
Source: Author`s computations based on GTA data; data accessed on 20.06.2016.
As we can see, an obvious leader in export promotion policies among the BRICs in recent years
has been India followed by Brazil and China. Russia represents an example of poor export
promotion policy. In Table 2, we further present typological structure of BRICs export incentives.
Table 2 Typological structure of BRICs export incentives implemented in 2006-2014
Country Number of export
incentives
Financial
incentives
Tax incentives VAT (Value Added
Tax) rebates
General measures*
Brazil 9 3 6 0 0
Russia 3 2 0 0 1
India 59 12 5 0 42
China 15 0 3 11 1
Note:*General measures may include financial and/or tax measures in a bundle with other promotion measures or it can be just a general framework
measure.
Source: Author`s computations based on GTA data; data accessed on 20.06.2016.
From Table 2 we can conclude that Brazil and especially China rely more on tax export incentives
while India and Russia – on financial export incentives (e.g. export subsidies). A large amount of
Indian export incentives cannot be classified as purely financial or tax incentives, and, hence, we
classify them as general measures.
In Table 3 we classify BRICs export incentives into targeted at final goods, primary or
processed intermediate goods. It should be noted that we cannot make fully precise classification
as data for export incentives is available at four-digit level of HS classification and Broad
Economic Categories (BEC) classification classifies goods into final and primary/processed
intermediate goods at six-digit level of HS classification. We consider an export incentive is
targeted at final/primary intermediate/processed intermediate good if all six-digit subindustries
within a respective four-digit industry are classified in BEC as final/primary
intermediate/processed intermediate goods, respectively. Those four-digit industries which include
six-digit industries of several types of goods are excluded from the analysis and classified as
“undetermined” in Table 3.
Table 3 BRICs export incentives by type of targeted goods in 2006-2014; by number of affected tariff lines
(four-digit HS 2007) including repetitions
Country Final goods Primary
intermediates
Processed
intermediates
Undetermined Total
Brazil 759 (25%)* 114 (4%) 1554 (52%) 553 (19%) 2980
Russia 89 (25%) 2 (1%) 164 (46%) 99 (28%) 354
India 1820 (34%) 212 (4%) 2398 (45%) 881 (17%) 5311
China 311 (30%) 20 (2%) 461 (44%) 245 (24%) 1037
Note: 1) *Percent to total in parentheses; 2) Type of the good is determined according to Broad Economic Categories (BEC) classification.
Source: Author`s computations based on GTA data; data accessed on 20.06.2016.
As we can see, BRIC countries have very similar structures of export incentives by targeted type
of good.  In particular, around half (44-52%) of affected tariff lines (including repetitions) are
processed intermediates in all four BRICs, followed by final goods (25-34%). Shares of primary
intermediates are very low (1-4%). This suggests that in our empirical analysis effects of the BRICs
export incentives for each other’s` exports will be dominated by those which emerge from
incentives targeted at processed intermediates and final goods.
Finally, in Appendix 1 we present industrial breakdown of BRICs export incentives. For
all BRICs the largest number of export incentives has been implemented in the two same two-digit
HS 2007 industries – (84) Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances; parts
thereof and (85) Electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof; sound recorders and
reproducers, television image and sound recorders and reproducers, and parts and accessories of
such articles. Two other industries in which all BRICs implemented significant number of export
incentives are (73) Articles of iron and steel and (90) Optical, photographic, cinematographic,
measuring, checking, precision, medical or surgical instruments and apparatus; parts and
accessories thereof. In general, it can be concluded that all BRIC countries make an emphasis on
promotion of export of goods in machinery and equipment category.
3.2. BRIC countries` participation in the world`s global value chains
When it comes to measurement of GVCs participation, the most known approach is the Hummels,
Ishii, and Yi (2001) indicator of “vertical specialization” and its refinement by Koopman, Powers,
Wang, and Wei (2011). Value chain participation is defined in terms of the origin of the value
added embodied in exports both looking backward and forward from a reference country:
backward is represented by foreign value added embodied in exports, and forward is represented
by domestic value added which is used as inputs to produce exports in the destination country
(Kowalski, Gonzalez, Ragoussis, and Ugarte (2015)). On Figures 2 and 3 we present relevant
indicators for BRIC countries which are readily available in OECD-TiVA database.
Figure 2 Foreign value added share of gross exports (backward GVCs participation index) in the BRICs, %
Note: According to OECD-TiVA definition backward GVC participation index captures the extent to which domestic firms use foreign
intermediate value added for exporting activities in a given country.
Source: OECD-TiVA data.
Figure 3 Domestic value added in exports of intermediate products as a share of total gross foreign exports
(forward GVCs participation index) in the BRICs, %
Note: According to OECD-TiVA definition forward GVC participation index captures the extent to which a given country’s exports are used by
firms in partner countries as inputs into their own exports.
Source: OECD-TiVA data.
As we can see from the Figures, only India`s backward participation index has increased
dramatically in the period (from 9.36 to 24.1). Otherwise, both indices have been rather stable for
the BRIC countries in 1995-2011. China has the highest participation in backward linkages of the
world GVCs followed by India. Russia and Brazil, on the other hand, participate significantly more
than India and China in forward linkages of the world GVCs. These are expectable trends, as, on
the one hand, China and India are widely recognized as the world`s manufacturing hubs, and, on
the other hand, Brazil and Russia are among the world`s largest suppliers of natural resources used
as inputs in production of various goods and services worldwide.
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On Figure 4 we depict backward against forward GVCs participation indices for all
countries for which data is available in OECD-TiVA database for the year 2011 (last available
data point).
Figure 4 Backward versus forward GVCs participation indices by country in 2011, %
Source: OECD-TiVA data.
As can be seen from Figure 4, Brazil and Russia are in the cluster of resource abundant countries
with high forward GVCs participation index and low backward GVCs participation index while
China and India are in the cluster of countries with more advanced industrial structure with
relatively equal indices ranging between 30 and 40%.
Trends in intermediate goods` trade are also indicative of GVCs formation because
fragmented production processes require that parts, components, and partially manufactured
subassemblies cross borders—sometimes more than once—before final goods are produced and
shipped to final markets (Feenstra 1998; Arndt and Kierzkowski 2001; Sturgeon and Mevedovic
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2011). On Figures 5 and 6 we present intermediate goods` trade volumes (export plus import) of
the BRICs and their annual growth rates, respectively.
Figure 5 Trade volume (export plus import) of intermediate goods in the BRICs, billion USD, 1995-2015
Note: Intermediate goods have been identified according to Broad Economic Categories (BEC) classification.
Source: Author`s calculations based on UN COMTRADE data.
Figure 6 Growth rates of trade volume (export plus import) of intermediate goods in the BRICs, %, 1995-2015
Note: 1) Intermediate goods have been identified according to BEC classification; 2) Growth rates have been computed as
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Source: Author`s calculations based on UN COMTRADE data.
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As we can see from the Figures, though in recent decades BRICs` intermediate trade has been
growing, the growth rates have been decreasing and have become even negative in 2015 for all the
BRICs.
Figures 5 and 6 provide us with the picture of respective trade dynamics in absolute terms.
Nevertheless, it is interesting to look at these trends relative to total trade of the BRICs and to
world trade in intermediate goods. On Figures 7 and 8 we present these indicators.
Figure 7 Trade volume (export plus import) of intermediate goods as percentage of total trade volume of the
BRICs, 1995-2015
Note: Intermediate goods have been identified according to BEC classification.
Source: Author`s calculations based on UN COMTRADE data.
Figure 8 BRICs trade volume (export plus import) of intermediate goods as percentage of world trade volume
of intermediate goods, 1995-2015
Note: Intermediate goods have been identified according to BEC classification.
Source: Author`s calculations based on UN COMTRADE data.
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From Figure 7 we can conclude that BRICs` trade structure with respect to intermediate versus
final goods have been rather stable in recent decades with highest share of intermediates in
Brazilian and Indian trade and lowest – in Chinese trade. From Figure 8 we can further see that
China`s role in the world trade of intermediate goods is rather significant with a strong growing
tendency. Brazil, Russia and India do not seem to be even close to China on that score.
In Figure 9 we present shares of processed intermediates in total intermediate trade
volumes of the BRICs.
Figure 9 Share of processed intermediates in total intermediate trade volume (export plus import) in the BRICs,
%, 1998-2015
Note: Intermediate goods have been identified according to BEC classification.
Source: Author`s calculations based on UN COMTRADE data.
As we can see, China exhibits the highest share of processed intermediates in its intermediate trade
among the BRICs and Russia – the lowest.
Finally, on Figures A2.1-A2.4 in Appendix 2, we present the structure of intermediate
goods` exports of the BRICs according to BEC classification2. As we can see, Brazilian
intermediate export has been rather diversified with dominance of processed and primary industrial
supplies. Primary fuels and lubricants dominate in Russian intermediate export. Processed
2 The purpose of the classification is to analyze international trade statistics by large economic classes of commodities,
distinguishing food, industrial supplies, capital equipment, consumer durables and consumer non-durables.
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industrial supplies strongly dominate in Indian intermediate export. Finally, processed and primary
industrial supplies prevail in Chinese intermediate export.
Overall, this brief descriptive analysis enables us to conclude that BRIC countries`
participation in the world`s GVCs have been rather high and stable in recent years which is good
in the context of this study. Furthermore, BRIC countries seem to have differential roles in the
world`s GVCs with Brazil and Russia providing core inputs for global production and China and
India serving as the world`s manufacturing hubs. This makes BRICs bloc a particularly interesting
example for comparative analysis.
3.3. BRICs participation in each other`s global value chains
In recent years, BRIC countries` participation in each other’s GVCs have been on rise. From
Figures 10-13 we can see that between the years of 1995 and 2011 value added in export by the
other three BRICs have increased for Brazil from 1.53 to 12.68%, for Russia from 2.67 to 12.32%,
for India from 5.23 to 11.94% and for China from 4.65 to 7.08%. However, it should be noted that
for Brazil, Russia and India most of this increase comes from China`s value added. On the other
hand, China has the lowest share of BRICs value added in its export among the BRICs so it has
also increased during the period by 1.5 times. We can also see that the shares of US, EU and Japan
value added in BRIC countries` export either have decreased or have not changed in the period
though they still remain high.
Figure 10                                                                       Figure 11
Figure 12                                                                       Figure 13
Source: Author`s calculations based on OECD-TiVA data.
Next, we look at inter-BRICs trade in intermediate goods presented on Figures 14-17.
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Figure 14                                                                              Figure 15
Figure 16                                                                              Figure 17
Note: Intermediate goods have been identified according to BEC classification.
Source: Author`s calculations based on UN COMTRADE data.
As we can see from the Figures, bilateral trade in intermediates between China, on the one hand,
and Brazil, Russia and India, on the other hand, have been especially on rise in recent decades.
Russia`s participation in inter-BRICs intermediate trade exhibits the lowest volumes in average.
This might indicate that in our empirical analysis Russia can emerge as an outlier. However, for
the purpose of comparative analysis, Russia`s inclusion can still provide us with interesting and
useful insights.
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Finally, on Figures A3.1-A3.12 in Appendix 3, we present the structure of intermediate
goods` exports in inter-BRICs trade according to BEC. It appears that Brazil largely exports
intermediates of food and fuel industries to other BRICs. Russian intermediate export to Brazil
and India largely consists of processed industrial supplies though Russian intermediate export to
China is mainly primary fuels. Processed industrial supplies dominate in Indian intermediate
export in inter-BRICs trade. India also exports rather significant amounts of parts and accessories
of capital goods (including transport equipment) to Brazil and Russia. China`s main export
categories  in  inter-BRICs  intermediate  trade  are  processed  industrial  supplies,  parts  and
accessories of capital goods (including transport equipment).
On the whole, it can be concluded that at present BRICs interdependence via GVCs is
rather high and, in general, has been growing in recent years. Individual roles of each BRIC
country in common GVCs seem to have its own unique characteristics. Furthermore, our
descriptive analysis enables us to predict the relative importance of different external effects of
export incentives outlined in this study. In particular, we can expect that positive backward
linkages` effects can be stronger for Brazil and Russia, especially for export of primary
intermediates, while positive forward linkages` and “spider” complementarity effects can be more
important for China and India.
4. EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK
4.1. Baseline framework
Empirical test of the impact of export policy on export must control for other determinants of trade.
Romalis (2004) developed a simple empirical model that shows that endowments of skilled labor,
unskilled labor and capital are important in explaining export patterns across countries and
industries. We adopt this model to our data and augment it to include export policy measures.
Specifically, for each country of interest (denoted by X, which is one of the BRIC countries) we
first estimate the following baseline equation:
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where i and t indexes industries and time (year), respectively; s denotes broad industrial sectors.
Xites ,  is the country X export share in the world export of an industry i (HS 2007, six-digit level)
in a year t (2009,…,2014). The  data  comes  from  UN  COMTRADE.  The  world  export  is
represented by the sum of exports of the following countries: Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada,
China, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Mexico, South Korea, Russia, United Kingdom and
USA. The use of export shares in international markets and not export flows as dependent variable
is important in the context of this study as export incentives originally target at capturing market
shares of foreign rivals in export markets.
Variables isi , ici and inci  are measures of skill, capital and natural capital (natural
resources) intensities for an industry i (converted from HS 1988/1992 to HS 2007, six-digit level).
The data on factor intensities comes from UNCTAD database on revealed factor intensity indices:
Revealed Capital Intensity Index (RCI), Revealed Human Capital Intensity Index (RHCI) and
Revealed Natural Resource Intensity Index (RNRI). The detailed description of the indices can be
found in Shirotori, Tumurchudur, and Cadot (2010). We briefly summarize the UNCTAD
computation strategy of the factor intensity indices in Appendix 4. Skill and capital intensity
indices ( isi and ici ) are taken for the year 2007 and natural capital/resources index ( inci ) – for the
year 2000, last available data points in the UNCTAD database.
We further control for export taxes and restrictions in country X, Xiniter _, . It is the number
of export taxes and restrictions implemented by country X in industry i (HS 2007, four-digit level)
which are effective/in force in a year t (2009,…, 2014). Data comes from GTA database (details
are below).
Next we add our variables of interest, industry-level measures of export incentives
Brazilitei , , Russiaitei , , Indiaitei ,  and Chinaitei ,  , which denote the number of export incentives
implemented in Brazil, Russia, India and China, respectively, in industry i which are effective/in
force in a year t (2009,…,2014). These variables reflect internal and external effects of export
incentives. Internal effects (i.e. effects of domestic export incentives for domestic export)
correspond to country X export incentives’ variable while the other three export incentives`
variables reflect external effects of export incentives (i.e. effects of domestic export incentives for
foreign exports or, putting this another way, effects of foreign export incentives for domestic
export). For example, if X is Brazil, then coefficient 5a  reflects internal effects of Brazilian export
incentives and 86 aa -  reflect external effects coming from other BRICs` (Russia, India and China,
respectively) export incentives for Brazilian export. Industry i for internal effects is four-digit
industry of HS 2007 but for external effects it is two-digit industry of HS 2007. That is we
investigate external effects of export incentives within two-digit HS industries. In particular, we
study how export incentives implemented in one BRIC country in some XX (two-digit) HS
industry affect other BRIC countries` exports in XXNN.NN (six-digit) HS subindustries. In other
words, while assessing external effects of export incentives, which, according to our theoretical
framework, are, at least partially, due to GVCs linkages, we count for GVCs linkages inside two-
digit industries. Our empirical framework does not count for the effects coming from outside of
the respective two-digit industries. Though theoretically these inter-industry effects should also
exist due to inter-industry GVCs linkages well shown in international input-output tables, we argue
that effects within narrower industries are in general stronger and our focus on them is justified.
We expect that internal effects of export incentives are always positive. External effects
of export incentives can be negative or positive or zero. Positive/negative respective coefficient
would imply that on aggregate level positive/negative external effects dominate. If the respective
coefficient is zero, then, we can suggest that, on aggregate level, respective positive and negative
external effects cancel each other.
We utilize Global Trade Alert (GTA) data to construct export incentives` and export
taxes/restrictions` variables. As was already noted above this database includes trade measures
implemented from 2006 but does not necessarily contain all implemented measures. Originally,
GTA data is reported for four-digit HS 2007 industries. We should also note that while constructing
export incentives` variables we consider only those export incentives, which, by GTA definition,
are “implemented and almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests” (in GTA
classification they are marked by red color). There are two other types of measures in GTA
database, “amber” and “green” measures, which are less/or not discriminative measures. These
measures can be, e.g., general export promotion strategy or reduction in export subsidy (the latter
measure cannot be actually considered as export incentives as it is a reduction in export incentive).
As in this study we are interested to see if generally discriminative export incentives can have
positive effects on foreign exports due to GVCs` linkages, we do not consider “amber” and “green”
measures in our empirical analysis. However, it is worth to mention that these measures are very
few and, hence, their inclusion most likely would not affect the results. While constructing export
taxes/restrictions` variables we also consider only “red” measures. “Amber” and “green” measures
mainly include adjustments to existing restrictions and are few.
Lastly, the model includes time (year) dummies (denoted by YD), dummies for broad
industrial sectors (denoted by SD; 21 sections of HS 2007 classification) and full set of their
interaction terms. ite  is an idiosyncratic error term, and iu  is unobserved industrial heterogeneity
(an industry i specific effect). ia , td , sf  and tsj are parameters to be estimated.
Looking at Figure 1, we can notice that external effects of export incentives can be
conveniently summed up by rows and columns. The “row” sums reflect resultant external effects
of export incentives implemented in country A targeted at final or primary intermediate or
processed intermediate goods for country B total export. To distinguish between external effects
of export incentives by type of good targeted by incentive we estimate equation (1) separately for
export incentives targeted at final, primary intermediate or processed intermediate goods. To
construct separate measures of export incentives targeted at respective types of goods we sum up
incentives targeted at four-digit final or primary intermediate or processed intermediate goods
within two-digit HS industries. We must note that as we use correspondence between BEC and
HS classification at six-digit industries to distinguish between final and primary/processed
intermediate goods, for some four-digit industries we cannot determine the type of good exactly
(when within this four-digit industry there are six-digit subindustries which represent different
types of goods). These four-digit industries have been excluded from the analysis. We should also
mention that variables which reflect internal effects of export incentives enter these estimations
just as in baseline model, i.e. at four-digit industries and for all export incentives without separation
by type of targeted good.  Interpretation of the coefficients of external effects of export incentives
in these separate estimations is rather straightforward. For example, if we estimate equation (1) for
Brazil (X is Brazil) and for export incentives targeted at final goods, then coefficients 6a / 7a / 8a
reflect external effects of Russian/Indian/Chinese export incentives targeted at final goods on
Brazilian total export.
The “column” sums reflect resultant external effects of all export incentives implemented
in country A for country B exports of different types of goods: final goods, primary or processed
intermediates. To differentiate between these resultant effects we include into our baseline
equation (1) two dummies for primary and processed intermediate goods (we again use
correspondence table between six-digit HS 2007 and BEC classifications to distinguish between
primary and processed intermediates and final goods),
iprimaryDIG _  and iprocessedDIG _ ,  and
their interaction terms with the four variables, which reflect effects of export incentives:
iit
ts
ts
t s
st
iChinaitiChinaitiIndiait
iIndiaitiRussiaitiRussiait
iBrazilitiBrazilitii
ChinaitIndiaitRussiaitBrazilitXinitiiiXit
uSDYDSDYD
processedDIGeiaprimaryDIGeiaprocessedDIGeia
primaryDIGeiaprocessedDIGeiaprimaryDIGeia
processedDIGeiaprimaryDIGeiaprocessedDIGaprimaryDIGa
eiaeiaeiaeiaeranciaciasiaaes
++´++
+´+´+´
+´+´+´
+´+´++
+++++++++=
åå å ejfd
___
___
____
,18,17,16
,15,14,13
,12,11109
,8,7,6,5_,43210,
(2).
Here we are interested in the coefficients of variables which reflect external effects of export
incentives and their interaction terms with dummies for intermediate goods. In particular,
positive/negative coefficient of the variable, which reflects the number of export incentives
implemented in country Y, one of the BRIC countries which is not X (one of the coefficients
85 aa - ), would indicate that, in accordance to our theoretical framework outlined on Figure 1,
positive/negative external effects coming from country Y export incentives dominate for final
goods` export of country X. Positive/negative sum of this coefficient and the coefficient of the
interaction term between this variable and dummy for intermediate good (either primary or
processed; one of the coefficients 1811 aa - ) would imply that positive/negative  external effects
coming from country Y export incentives dominate for primary or processed intermediate goods`
export of country X.
Finally, to evaluate “within cells” effects as outlined on Figure 1 we estimate equation (2)
separately for export incentives targeted at final, primary intermediate or processed intermediate
goods. For example, if we estimate equation (2) for Brazil (X is Brazil) and for export incentives
targeted at final goods, coefficient 6a / 7a / 8a will reflect external effects of
Russian/Indian/Chinese export incentives targeted at final goods on Brazilian export of final
goods; sum of coefficients 6a / 7a / 8a  and 13a / 15a / 17a  - effects of Russian/Indian/Chinese export
incentives targeted at final goods on Brazilian export of primary intermediates and sum of
coefficients 6a / 7a / 8a  and 14a / 16a / 18a - effects of Russian/Indian/Chinese export incentives
targeted at final goods on Brazilian export of processed intermediates.
4.2. Separate test for positive backward linkages` effect
As according to our theoretical framework positive backward linkages` effect emerges only for
bilateral export, in particular, within our framework, export from country B to country A, we can
separately test for the presence of this effect. More specifically, for separate test of our proposition
(1) on positive backward linkages` effect we estimate slightly modified equation (2) for respective
bilateral exports of the BRICs:
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(3),
where the dependent variable denoted by XYites ,  is the share of country X`s export to country Y
(both X and Y are BRICs countries) in the world export to country Y in an industry i (HS 2007,
six-digit) in a year t (2009-2014). World export is determined in the same way as in baseline
equations. Additionally to control variables from equations (1) and (2) we also control here for
country Y import tariff (ad valorem tax rate, Most Favored Nation) in industry i (HS 2007, six-
digit) in a year t, Yinitit _, . Data comes from World Integrated Trade Solution database (WITS; Trade
Analysis Information System (TRAINS) raw data).
We expect that in the presence of positive backward linkages` effects, positive external
effects of export incentives implemented in country Y for country X`s export to country Y will
crowd in intermediate goods. In particular, e.g. assuming that Y denotes Brazil and X – China, we
expect 126 aa +  and/or 136 aa +  to be positive. This would imply that Brazilian export incentives
stimulate Chinese export of primary and/or processed intermediates, respectively, to Brazil, where
they are used in production of subsidized final/higher-tier intermediate goods. To concretize our
results in accordance with our framework on Figure 1 (i.e. to get “within cells” results) we further
estimate equation (3) separately for export incentives targeted at final and processed intermediate
goods. We should note that according to our framework export incentives targeted at primary
intermediates do not lead to positive backward linkages` effects.
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
5.1. Baseline results
Baseline random effects panel data model`s estimates of equations (1) and (2) for each BRIC
country for total number of export incentives are presented in Table 4. Descriptive statistics and
correlation matrix of the dependent and explanatory variables are reported in Appendix 5. Though
it can be seen that our variables, which reflect external effects of export incentives are rather highly
correlated, we assume that until results look reasonable, we can accept them. Moreover, one of
these variables always reflects internal effects of export incentives and is taken at four-digit
industries` level, which removes multicollinearity problem at least partially as export incentives`
variables taken at four-digit industries` level correlate significantly less with respective variables
taken at two-digit industries` level (see Appendix 5).
Table 4 Baseline random effects panel data model estimation results
Variable/Model Brazil Russia India China
Eq. (1) Eq. (2) Eq. (1) Eq. (2) Eq. (1) Eq. (2) Eq. (1) Eq. (2)
Constant -0,21 (0.365) -0,17 (0.364) -0,235
(0.367)
-0,205
(0.367)
-0,269 (0.353) -0,279
(0.352)
-0,839
(0.326)**
-0,872
(0.321)***
isi
0,01 (0.026) 0,017 (0.026) 0,072
(0.026)***
0,077
(0.026)***
-0,241
(0.023)***
-0,239
(0.023)***
0,035
(0.023)
0,025
(0.023)
ici
-0,178 (0.026)*** -0,192 (0.026)*** -0,163
(0.026)***
-0,173
(0.026)***
-0,025 (0.024) -0,027
(0.024)
-0,259
(0.023)***
-0,253
(0.023)***
inci
-0,003 (0.015) -0,006 (0.015) 0,111
(0.015)***
0,109
(0.015)***
-0,027
(0.013)**
-0,029
(0.013)**
-0,073
(0.013)***
-0,061
(0.013)***
Xiniter _,
-0,005
(0.004)
-0,005
(0.004)
-0,006 (0.005) -0,006
(0.005)
-0,002
(0.002)
-0,002
(0.002)
Brazilitei ,
0,008 (0.005)* -0,003 (0.007) -0,002
(0.014)
-0,022
(0.016)
-0,003 (0.018) -0,016
(0.021)
-0,003
(0.01)
0,008
(0.012)
Russiaitei ,
0,008 (0.008) -0,004 (0.01) 0,015
(0.004)***
0,003
(0.007)
0,015 (0.01) 0,016
(0.011)
-0,022
(0.007)***
0,009
(0.009)
Indiaitei ,
-0,022 (0.011)** -0,001 (0.014) 0,008
(0.011)
0,02
(0.012)
0,032
(0.007)***
0,034
(0.008)***
0,014
(0.01)
-0,035
(0.013)***
Chinaitei ,
0,042 (0.037) 0,1 (0.041) -0,064
(0.039)*
0,001
(0.042)
0,214
(0.037)***
0,216
(0.041)***
0,067
(0.012)***
0,032
(0.017)*
DIG_primary 0,13 (0.186) 0,128
(0.185)
0,157
(0.167)
-0,674
(0.093)***
DIG_processed 0,144 (0.034)*** 0,115
(0.034)***
0,062
(0.031)**
-0,274
(0.031)***
BraziliteiprimaryDIG ,*_
0,041 (0.019)** 0,029
(0.071)
0,089
(0.091)
-0,144
(0.053)***
BraziliteiprocessedDIG ,*_
0,017 (0.008)** 0,038
(0.016)**
0,024
(0.019)
-0,028
(0.012)**
RussiaiteiprimaryDIG ,*_
0,05 (0.054) -0,061
(0.044)
-0,097
(0.071)
-0,111
(0.049)**
RussiaiteiprocessedDIG ,*_
0,015 (0.01) 0,017
(0.007)**
0,001
(0.008)
-0,045
(0.009)***
IndiaiteiprimaryDIG ,*_
0,008 (0.053) -0,075
(0.051)
0,005
(0.028)
0,045
(0.05)
IndiaiteiprocessedDIG ,*_
-0,025 (0.013)** -0,018
(0.011)*
-0,002
(0.008)
0,063
(0.013)***
ChinaiteiprimaryDIG ,*_
-0,081 (0.29) 0,102
(0.293)
0,054
(0.272)
0,115
(0.101)
ChinaiteiprocessedDIG ,*_
-0,092 (0.029)*** -0,105
(0.031)***
0,005
(0.031)
0,045
(0.022)**
R-squared (overall) 0.064 0.07 0.061 0.064 0.122 0.123 0.245 0.266
N. obs. 30 178 30 178 30 178 30 178 30 178 30 178 30 178 30 178
Note: 1) * if p-value < 0.10, ** if p-value < 0.05, *** if p-value < 0.01; 2) standard errors in parentheses; 3) prior to estimation all variables have
been standardized; 4) time, sectoral dummies and full set of their interaction terms are included in all models; 5) cells with coefficients which reflect
internal effects of export incentives are marked by grey color.
First, as strategic trade theory predicts domestic export incentives implemented in the BRIC
countries are positively associated with their domestic export shares of the affected product groups
in the world market. Respective positive coefficients of equation (1) are statistically significant for
all the BRICs. Estimating equation (2) we find some interesting evidence on differences in internal
effects of export incentives between final and intermediate goods. In particular, Brazilian domestic
export incentives seem to be effective in promotion of domestic export of intermediate but not
final goods. Russian export incentives are effective in promotion of processed intermediates but
not primary intermediates and final goods. Indian export incentives do not seem to have strong
differential effects for the domestic export of final versus intermediate goods. Finally, Chinese
export incentives seem to be most effective in the export promotion of domestic processed
intermediates but also effective in promotion of final goods and primary intermediates. BRICs`
domestic export taxes/restrictions are negatively associated with domestic export (albeit none of
the coefficients is statistically significant), which is also plausible. We should note that this
variable is absent for Brazil as in GTA database we did not find any single export restriction/tax
measure implemented by Brazil.
For external effects of export incentives, the evidence is mixed as expected. Estimating
equation (1) we find that negative significant external effects are coming from Indian export
incentives to Brazil`s export, from Russian export incentives to China`s export and from Chinese
export incentives to Russia`s export. These results imply that on aggregate level domestic export
incentives help India to win in competition with Brazil for export shares in international markets,
Russia - in competition with China and China – in competition with Russia. On the other hand,
Chinese export incentives appear to positively affect Indian export. This result implies that positive
external  effects  of  export  incentives,  which  emerge  due  to  GVCs  linkages  via  trade  in
intermediates as this study proposes, seem to exist and can be even dominant on aggregate level.
When we decompose external effects of export incentives between final and intermediate
goods in equation (2), we get rather informative results. First, we find that Indian and Chinese
export incentives discourage Brazilian export of processed intermediates. Similarly, we find that
Chinese and Indian export incentives negatively affect Russian export of processed intermediates.
Finally, there is quite strong evidence that Brazilian and Russian export incentives negatively
affect Chinese export of both primary and processed intermediates. According to our theoretical
framework, it can indicate the presence of negative “competition for market share” effects (both
direct and indirect as specified in Figure 1).  It is remarkable that strict majority of negative effects
concern export of processed intermediates.
Second, we find that Brazilian export incentives positively affect Russian export of
processed intermediates. We also find that positive effects of Chinese export incentives for Indian
export seem to be strong for the export of all three types of goods. These results provide further
support for the existence of positive external effects of export incentives, which emerge due to
GVCs linkages.
Results for our controls - factor intensities` variables look rather realistic. In particular,
we find that Brazil, Russia and China tend to export products with relatively lower physical capital
intensity; for India this result is insignificant. For India industrial export shares are negatively
associated with skilled labor (human capital) intensity while for Russia respective relationship is
positive.  Finally, natural capital (natural resources intensity) is positively associated with
industrial export shares of Russia and negatively with those of India and China. In general, all
these results reflect relative factor endowments of the BRICs that is in line with Romalis (2004)
predictions. From Table 5 we can see that all the BRICs except Russia have physical capital stock
per worker much below world average. However, for Russia it has decreased sharply between
1992 and 2007 and assuming that this tendency has continued in the subsequent years, the result
of negative association between industries` physical capital intensities and Russia`s industrial
export shares in the world market does not look surprising. Second, human capital measured by
average years of schooling is significantly below world average for India and only for Russia it is
above average. Finally, only Russia has an obvious advantage in natural resources` endowments
compared to the world average while China and India are rather resource scarce countries.
Table 5 Relative endowments in the BRICs: Relative to World average
Physical capital stock per
worker in 2000 USD
Average years of
schooling
Total natural capital per
worker, 2000 USD
1992 2007 1992 2007 1994 2000
Brazil 0,59 0,41 0,7 0,9 0,86 1,00
Russia 1,73 0,96 1,47 1,28 NA 2,44
India 0,13 0,18 0,52 0,54 0,54 0,35
China 0,12 0,35 0,89 0,95 0,24 0,27
  Source: Author`s computations based on UNCTAD data.
Results for direct effects of the dummies for primary and processed intermediates also deserve to
be discussed. Dummy for processed intermediates is positive and highly statistically significant
for Brazil, Russia and India, which implies that conditional on all other variables included in the
model, Brazil, Russia and India export more processed intermediates than final and primary
intermediate goods. For China, both dummies are negative and highly statistically significant,
which indicates that, conditional on the model, China exports more final goods than intermediates.
 Next, to concretize our results in accordance to our theoretical framework outlined in
Figure 1 we estimate equations (1) and (2) separately for export incentives targeted at final,
primary and processed intermediate goods. Estimation results are presented in Tables 6-8.
Table 6 External effects of export incentives targeted at final goods: Random effects panel data model
estimation results
Variable/Model Brazil Russia India China
Eq. (1) Eq. (2) Eq. (1) Eq. (2) Eq. (1) Eq. (2) Eq. (1) Eq. (2)
Constant -0,262
(0.365)
-0,216
(0.364)
-0,2 (0.367) -0,163
(0.366)
-0,415 (0.353) -0,396 (0.353) -0,835 (0.328)** -0,868
(0.323)***
isi
0,008
(0.026)
0,013
(0.026)
0,076
(0.026)***
0,078
(0.026)***
-0,253
(0.023)***
-0,25 (0.023)*** 0,037 (0.023) 0,027
(0.023)
ici
-0,173
(0.026)***
-0,185
(0.026)***
-0,17
(0.026)***
-0,179
(0.026)***
0,0001 (0.023) -0,003 (0.024) -0,262
(0.023)***
-0,255
(0.023)***
inci
-0,003
(0.015)
-0,005
(0.015)
0,111
(0.015)***
0,11
(0.015)***
-0,029 (0.013)** -0,029 (0.013)** -0,073
(0.013)***
-0,062
(0.013)***
Xiniter _,
-0,005
(0.004)
-0,006
(0.004)
-0,006 (0.005) -0,005 (0.005) -0,002 (0.002) -0,002
(0.002)
Brazilitei ,
0,008
(0.005)*
-0,001
(0.007)
-0,039
(0.014)***
-0,042
(0.014)***
-0,04 (0.018)** -0,044 (0.019)** 0,001 (0.01) -0,01
(0.011)
Russiaitei ,
0,0003
(0.005)
-0,004
(0.005)
0,016
(0.004)***
0,001
(0.006)
0,011 (0.008) 0,009 (0.008) -0,006 (0.004) 0,006
(0.005)
Indiaitei ,
0,003
(0.007)
0,008
(0.007)
-0,007
(0.008)
0,002
(0.008)
0,033 (0.007)*** 0,033 (0.008)*** -0,016 (0.006)** -0,029
(0.007)***
Chinaitei ,
-0,038
(0.029)
0,04 (0.034) 0,008
(0.031)
0,074
(0.036)**
0,046 (0.031) 0,075 (0.036)** 0,066 (0.012)*** 0,029
(0.017)*
DIG_primary 0,423
(0.157)***
0,597
(0.158)***
-0,17 (0.149) -0,612
(0.099)***
DIG_processed 0,159
(0.038)***
0,118
(0.037)***
0,066 (0.034)* -0,284
(0.032)***
BraziliteiprimaryDIG ,*_
0,038
(0.019)**
0,145 (0.1) 0,199 (0.116)* 0,012
(0.078)
BraziliteiprocessedDIG ,*_
0,013 (0.008
/pv=0.104/
0,021
(0.019)
0,024 (0.023) -0,043
(0.014)***
RussiaiteiprimaryDIG ,*_
0,4
(0.114)***
-0,057
(0.044)
-0,712
(0.185)***
-0,123
(0.103)
RussiaiteiprocessedDIG ,*_
0,006
(0.009)
0,021
(0.007)***
-0,002 (0.008) -0,039
(0.008)***
IndiaiteiprimaryDIG ,*_
-0,028
(0.069)
-0,074
(0.084)
0,009 (0.027) 0,029
(0.065)
IndiaiteiprocessedDIG ,*_
-0,013
(0.017)
-0,035
(0.015)**
0,0003 (0.008) 0,088
(0.017)***
ChinaiteiprimaryDIG ,*_
0,274
(0.237)
0,746
(0.238)***
-0,332 (0.217) 0,115
(0.101)
ChinaiteiprocessedDIG ,*_
-0,078
(0.033)*
-0,115
(0.035)***
-0,021 (0.036) 0,048
(0.023)**
R-squared (overall) 0.064 0.068 0.062 0.068 0.118 0.118 0.242 0.264
N. obs. 30,178 30,178 30,178 30,178 30,178 30,178 30,178 30,178
Note: 1) * if p-value < 0.10, ** if p-value < 0.05, *** if p-value < 0.01; 2) standard errors in parentheses; 3) prior to estimation all variables have
been standardized; 4) time, sectoral dummies and full set of their interaction terms are included in all models; 5) cells with coefficients which reflect
internal effects of export incentives are marked by grey color.
Table 7 External effects of export incentives targeted at primary intermediate goods: Random effects panel
data model estimation results
Variable/Model Brazil Russia India China
Eq. (1) Eq. (2) Eq. (1) Eq. (2) Eq. (1) Eq. (2) Eq. (1) Eq. (2)
Constant -0,238 (0.364) -0,25 (0.363) -0,191
(0.366)
-0,184
(0.367)
-0,412 (0.352) -0,346
(0.352)
-0,845
(0.329)**
-0,874
(0.324)***
isi
0,008 (0.026) 0,009 (0.026) 0,075
(0.026)***
0,081
(0.026)***
-0,248 (0.023)*** -0,247
(0.023)***
0,036 (0.023) 0,024
(0.023)
ici
-0,173
(0.026)***
-0,181
(0.026)***
-0,17
(0.026)***
-0,176
(0.026)***
-0,001 (0.023) -0,004
(0.023)
-0,261
(0.024)***
-0,253
(0.023)***
inci
-0,003 (0.015) -0,005 (0.015) 0,112
(0.015)***
0,11
(0.015)***
-0,03 (0.013)** -0,03
(0.013)**
-0,072
(0.013)***
-0,061
(0.013)***
Xiniter _,
-0,005
(0.004)
-0,005
(0.004)
-0,005 (0.005) -0,007
(0.005)
-0,002
(0.002)
-0,002
(0.002)
Brazilitei ,
0,008 (0.005)
/pv=0.103/
0,001 (0.006) 0,003
(0.008)
-0,004
(0.052)
-0,003 (0.011) 0,233
(0.062)***
-0,025
(0.006)***
-0,055
(0.04)
Russiaitei ,
0,001 (0.002) 0,103 (0.011)*** 0,016
(0.004)***
0,009
(0.005)
/pv=0.101/
-0,004 (0.003) -0,123
(0.019)***
-0,005
(0.002)**
0,004
(0.01)
Indiaitei ,
-0,0003 (0.003) -0,027 (0.014)* -0,004
(0.004)
-0,001
(0.017)
0,033 (0.007)*** 0,033
(0.007)***
-0,003
(0.003)
0,029
(0.013)**
Chinaitei ,
-0,007 (0.015) -0,02 (0.03) -0,005
(0.015)
0,024
(0.03)
0,059 (0.014)*** 0,063
(0.026)**
0,067
(0.012)***
0,034
(0.017)*
DIG_primary 0,123 (0.068)* 0,103
(0.07)
-0,05 (0.065) -0,563
(0.091)***
DIG_processed 0,138 (0.034)*** 0,103
(0.036)***
-0,025
(0.034)
-0,261
(0.033)***
BraziliteiprimaryDIG ,*_
0,039 (0.018)** 0,006
(0.052)
-0,231
(0.063)***
0,046
(0.04)
BraziliteiprocessedDIG ,*_
0,007 (0.007) 0,008
(0.052)
-0,267
(0.063)***
0,021
(0.04)
RussiaiteiprimaryDIG ,*_
-0,106
(0.011)***
-0,07
(0.044)
/pv=0.107/
0,123
(0.019)***
-0,007
(0.01)
RussiaiteiprocessedDIG ,*_
Omitted 0,009
(0.005)**
Omitted Omitted
IndiaiteiprimaryDIG ,*_
0,027 (0.014)* -0,006
(0.017)
0,001 (0.027) -0,028
(0.013)**
IndiaiteiprocessedDIG ,*_
0,02 (0.014) 0,006
(0.018)
0,002 (0.007) -0,043
(0.013)***
ChinaiteiprimaryDIG ,*_
0,02 (0.037) -0,063
(0.037)*
-0,005
(0.033)
0,118
(0.101)
ChinaiteiprocessedDIG ,*_
-0,023 (0.041) -0,014
(0.041)
-0,004
(0.037)
0,043
(0.022)*
R-squared (overall) 0.064 0.068 0.06 0.063 0.12 0.121 0.245 0.266
N. obs. 30 178 30 178 30 178 30 178 30 178 30 178 30 178 30 178
Note: 1) * if p-value < 0.10, ** if p-value < 0.05, *** if p-value < 0.01; 2) standard errors in parentheses; 3) prior to estimation all variables have
been standardized; 4) time, sectoral dummies and full set of their interaction terms are included in all models; 5) cells with coefficients which reflect
internal effects of export incentives are marked by grey color.
Table 8 External effects of export incentives targeted at processed intermediate goods: Random effects panel
data model estimation results
Variable/Model Brazil Russia India China
Eq. (1) Eq. (2) Eq. (1) Eq. (2) Eq. (1) Eq. (2) Eq. (1) Eq. (2)
Constant -0,243 (0.365) -0,189 (0.365) -0,201
(0.366)
-0,194
(0.367)
-0,34 (0.352) -0,385 (0.353) -0,823
(0.329)**
-0,812
(0.322)**
isi
0,007 (0.026) 0,011 (0.026) 0,074
(0.026)***
0,076
(0.025)***
-0,244
(0.023)***
-0,243
(0.023)***
0,037 (0.023) 0,025
(0.023)
ici
-0,172
(0.026)***
-0,18 (0.026)*** -0,165
(0.026)***
-0,171
(0.026)***
-0,018 (0.024) -0,017 (0.024) -0,261
(0.023)***
-0,254
(0.023)***
inci
-0,003 (0.015) -0,006 (0.015) 0,11
(0.015)***
0,108
(0.015)***
-0,025
(0.013)*
-0,026
(0.013)*
-0,073
(0.013)***
-0,06
(0.013)***
Xiniter _,
-0,005
(0.004)
-0,005
(0.004)
-0,006 (0.005) -0,006 (0.005) -0,002 (0.002) -0,002
(0.002)
Brazilitei ,
0,008 (0.005)* -0,0004 (0.007) 0,018
(0.012)
-0,029
(0.026)
0,014 (0.013) -0,001 (0.033) 0,002 (0.009) 0,048
(0.019)**
Russiaitei ,
0,003 (0.004) 0,012 (0.011) 0,014
(0.004)***
0,007
(0.006)
0,007 (0.006) -0,001 (0.011) -0,001 (0.004) -0,002
(0.01)
Indiaitei ,
-0,012 (0.005)** -0,022 (0.017) 0,01
(0.006)
/pv=0.103/
0,019
(0.014)
0,032
(0.007)***
0,035
(0.008)***
0,019
(0.005)***
0,027
(0.016)
/pv=0.106/
Chinaitei ,
-0,002 (0.018) 0,081 (0.047)* -0,043
(0.019)**
0,015
(0.049)
0,094
(0.018)***
0,058 (0.048) 0,065
(0.012)***
0,028
(0.017)
/pv=0.101/
DIG_primary 0,036 (0.112) 0,031
(0.112)
0,1 (0.102) -0,662
(0.091)***
DIG_processed 0,114 (0.036)*** 0,105
(0.036)***
0,034 (0.034) -0,3
(0.032)***
BraziliteiprimaryDIG ,*_
0,04 (0.018)** 0,006
(0.055)
0,004 (0.066) -0,118
(0.041)***
BraziliteiprocessedDIG ,*_
0,014 (0.008)* 0,054
(0.026)**
0,017 (0.032) -0,044
(0.019)**
RussiaiteiprimaryDIG ,*_
0,009 (0.021) -0,063
(0.044)
-0,009 (0.025) -0,016
(0.02)
RussiaiteiprocessedDIG ,*_
-0,009 (0.01) 0,011
(0.006)*
0,009 (0.01) 0,002
(0.01)
IndiaiteiprimaryDIG ,*_
0,016 (0.038) -0,016
(0.035)
0,003 (0.028) -0,024
(0.038)
IndiaiteiprocessedDIG ,*_
0,009 (0.017) -0,015
(0.014)
-0,006 (0.008) -0,007
(0.016)
ChinaiteiprimaryDIG ,*_
-0,19 (0.165) -0,058
(0.17)
0,042 (0.162) 0,113
(0.101)
ChinaiteiprocessedDIG ,*_
-0,102 (0.046)** -0,073
(0.048)
0,037 (0.047) 0,049
(0.022)**
R-squared (overall) 0.064 0.069 0.062 0.064 0.122 0.123 0.244 0.268
N. obs. 30 178 30 178 30 178 30 178 30 178 30 178 30 178 30 178
Note: 1) * if p-value < 0.10, ** if p-value < 0.05, *** if p-value < 0.01; 2) standard errors in parentheses; 3) prior to estimation all variables have
been standardized; 4) time, sectoral dummies and full set of their interaction terms are included in all models; 5) cells with coefficients which reflect
internal effects of export incentives are marked by grey color.
First, we should mention that results for control variables (including direct effects of dummies for
intermediates) and internal effects of export incentives do not differ much from the baseline results
in table 4.
In what follows we discuss results for external effects of export incentives for each BRIC
country. For Brazil, first, there is rather strong evidence that Russian export incentives targeted at
final goods stimulate Brazilian export of primary intermediates (equation (2) for Brazil, Table 6).
According to our framework, this can be due to positive backward linkages` effects and/or indirect
positive backward linkages` “competition for market share” effects. We also find that Russian
export incentives targeted at primary goods positively affect Brazilian export of final goods
(equation (2) for Brazil, Table 7). This result reflects positive forward linkages` and/or indirect
positive forward linkages` “competition for market share” effects. At last, we find that Chinese
export incentives targeted at processed intermediates positively affect Brazilian export of final
goods (positive forward linkages` and/or indirect positive forward linkages` “competition for
market share” effects) and negatively – Brazilian export of processed intermediates (negative
“competition for market share” and/or indirect negative backward linkages` “competition for
market share” effects; equation (2) for Brazil, Table 8).
For Russia, first, we find that negative effects coming from Chinese export incentives to
Russian export found in Table 4 (equation (1) for Russia) mainly come from Chinese export
incentives targeted at processed intermediates (equation (1) for Russia, Table 8). There is some
evidence that these negative effects are strongest for Russian export of processed intermediates
(equation (2) for Russia, Table 8), which indicates the presence of negative “competition for
market share” and/or indirect negative backward linkages` “competition for market share” effects.
Brazilian export incentives targeted at final goods negatively affect Russian export of final goods
(equation (2) for Russia, Table 6). This is evidence of negative “competition for market share”
effects. We further find that Chinese export incentives targeted at final goods positively affect
Russian export of final goods (equation (2) for Russia, Table 6), which, according to our
framework, indicates the presence of indirect positive “complementary final goods” effects. There
is also evidence of positive effects of Chinese export incentives targeted at final goods for Russian
export of primary goods, which indicates the presence of positive backward linkages` and/or
indirect positive backward linkages` “competition for market share” effects (equation (2) for
Russia, Table 6). We also find that Indian export incentives targeted at final goods negatively
affect Russian export of processed intermediates (equation (2) for Russia, Table 6). This result
reflects indirect negative backward linkages` “competition for market share” effects according to
our framework. Next, we find negative effects of Chinese export incentives targeted at primary
intermediates for Russian export of primary intermediates (equation (2) for Russia, Table 7). This
finding indicates the presence of negative “competition for market share” effects. Finally, we find
positive effects coming from Brazilian export incentives targeted at processed intermediates to
Russian export of processed intermediates (equation (2) for Russia, Table 8). This indicates the
presence of positive forward and/or backward linkages` effects and/or “spider” complementarity
effects and/or indirect positive forward and backward linkages` “competition for market share”
effects.
For India we, first, find that Brazilian export incentives targeted at final goods negatively
affect Indian export of final goods (equation (2) for India, Table 6) which indicates the presence
of negative  ”competition for market share” effects. At the same time, Brazilian export incentives
targeted at final goods positively affect Indian export of primary intermediates (equation (2) for
India, Table 6) which reflects positive backward linkages` effects and/or indirect positive
backward linkages` “competition for market share” effect. We further find that Chinese export
incentives targeted at final goods positively affect Indian export of final goods (equation (2) for
India, Table 6) which points to the presence of indirect “complementary final goods” positive
effects. We also find that Russian export incentives targeted at final goods negatively affect Indian
export of primary intermediates (equation (2) for India, Table 6). This indicates the presence of
indirect negative backward linkages` “competition for market share” effects. Next, we find that
Brazilian and Chinese export incentives targeted at primary intermediates positively affect Indian
export of final goods (equation (2) for India, Table 7) which indicates the presence of positive
forward linkages` and/or indirect positive forward linkages` “competition for market share”
effects. We also find that Chinese export incentives targeted at primary intermediates positively
affect Indian export of primary and processed intermediates (equation (2) for India, Table 7). This
suggests the presence of a bundle of positive external effects of Chinese export incentives for
Indian export. In contradiction to our theoretical framework, we find that Russian export incentives
targeted at primary intermediates negatively affect Indian export of final goods (equation (2) for
India, Table 7). According to our framework, this effect can be only positive. However, we aware
that GVCs networks are more complex than in our simplified framework, which, for example,
does not count for specificity of trade relations between different countries (e.g. trade agreements).
Finally, we find that Chinese export incentives targeted at processed intermediates positively affect
Indian export (equation (1) for India, Table 8). However, there is no strong evidence on their
differential effects for Indian export of different types of goods (equation (2) for India, Table 8).
For China, first, we find that negative effects of Russian export incentives for Chinese
export found in table 4 (equation (1) for China)  mainly come from those targeted at primary
intermediates (equation (1) for China, Table 7). However, their differential effects for Chinese
export of different types of goods are not clear (equation (2) for China, Table 7). There is also
rather strong evidence that Indian export incentives targeted at final goods negatively affect
Chinese export of final goods, which indicates the presence of negative “competition for market
share” effects (equation (2) for China, Table 6). On the other hand, Indian export incentives
targeted at final goods positively affect Chinese export of processed intermediates (equation (2)
for China, Table 6) which points to the presence of positive backward linkages` and/or indirect
positive backward linkages` “competition for market share” effects. However, Brazilian and
Russian export incentives targeted at final goods negatively affect Chinese export of processed
intermediates (equation (2) for China, Table 6), which indicates the presence of indirect negative
backward linkages` “competition for market share” effects. We also find that Brazilian export
incentives targeted at primary intermediates negatively affect Chinese export (equation (1) for
China, Table 7) though differential effects for export by type of goods are not clear (equation (2)
for China, Table 7). There is evidence that Indian export incentives targeted at primary
intermediates positively affect Chinese export of final goods (which indicates the presence of
positive forward linkages` effects and/or indirect positive forward linkages` “competition for
market share” effects) but negatively - Chinese export of processed intermediates (equation (2) for
China, Table 7). The latter result contradicts our theoretical framework, as the respective effect
can be only positive. As for the case of negative effects of Russian export incentives targeted at
primary intermediates for Indian export of final goods discussed above, we suggest that this finding
can be due to some additional factors (e.g. bilateral trade agreements) for which we do not count
in our simplified framework. We further find that Indian export incentives targeted at processed
intermediates positively affect Chinese export of final goods and primary and processed
intermediate goods (equation (2) for China, Table 8)  which points to the presence of a bundle of
positive external effects. Finally, there is evidence that Brazilian export incentives targeted at
processed intermediates positively affect Chinese export of final goods (which points to the
presence of positive forward linkages` and indirect positive forward linkages` “competition for
market share” effects) and negatively – Chinese export of primary intermediates (which indicates
the presence of indirect negative backward linkages` “competition for market share” effect;
equation (2) for China, Table 8).
5.2. Results of separate test for positive backward linkages` effect
To separately test for positive backward linkages` effect we first present random effects model`s
estimation results of equation (3) for BRICs bilateral exports for total number of export incentives
in Table 9.
Table 9 Backward linkages` effect`s test: Random effects panel data model estimation results
Variable/Model Export from Brazil (X) to Export from Russia (X) to Export from India (X) to Export from China (X) to
Russia
(Y)
India
(Y)
China
(Y)
Brazil
(Y)
India
(Y)
China
(Y)
Brazil
(Y)
Russia
(Y)
China
(Y)
Brazil
(Y)
Russia
(Y)
India
(Y)
Constant -0,074
(0.346)
-0,107
(0.369)
-0,11
(0.366)
-0,247
(0.379)
-0,224
(0.379)
-0,07
(0.38)
-0,411
(0.371)
-0,285
(0.381)
0,223
(0.367)
-0,634
(0.327)*
-0,617
(0.349)*
-0,922
(0.342)**
*
isi
0,006
(0.022)
-0,004
(0.024)
-0,021
(0.023)
0,059
(0.025)**
0,055
(0.024)**
0,047
(0.024)*
-0,202
(0.024)**
*
-0,121
(0.024)**
*
-0,185
(0.023)**
*
0,032
(0.022)
-0,002
(0.024)
-0,015
(0.023)
ici
-0,079
(0.023)**
*
-0,075
(0.025)**
*
-0,107
(0.024)**
*
-0,132
(0.026)**
*
-0,106
(0.024)**
*
-0,103
(0.025)**
*
-0,01
(0.024)
-0,016
(0.025)
-0,042
(0.024)*
-0,178
(0.023)**
*
-0,128
(0.024)**
*
-0,107
(0.024)**
*
inci
-0,022
(0.013)*
0,003
(0.014)
-0,0004
(0.013)
0,011
(0.014)
0,041
(0.014)**
*
0,067
(0.014)**
*
-0,018
(0.014)
-0,041
(0.014)**
*
-0,019
(0.013)
-0,053
(0.013)**
*
-0,042
(0.014)**
*
-0,057
(0.014)**
*
Xiniter _,
-0,002
(0.008)
0,013
(0.008)
-0,014
(0.007)**
0,008
(0.008)
0,008
(0.009)
-0,005
(0.007)
-0,004
(0.004)
0,006
(0.004)
-0,002
(0.004)
Yitit ,
0,006
(0.011)
0,006
(0.014)
-0,023
(0.013)*
-0,083
(0.019)**
*
-0,014
(0.014)
-0,053
(0.013)**
*
-0,054
(0.018)**
*
-0,05
(0.012)**
*
-0,029
(0.013)**
0,165
(0.016)**
*
0,047
(0.01)***
-0,017
(0.012)
Brazilitei ,
-0,012
(0.013)
-0,013
(0.014)
0,004
(0.013)
-0,038
(0.027)
-0,059
(0.031)*
-0,048
(0.027)*
-0,03
(0.027)
0,016
(0.028)
-0,015
(0.026)
0,008
(0.019)
0,019
(0.02)
0,008
(0.02)
Russiaitei ,
0,011
(0.019)
-0,029
(0.021)
-0,03
(0.019)
0,002
(0.012)
0,021
(0.013)
0,008
(0.011)
0,026
(0.014)*
0,005
(0.015)
-0,003
(0.014)
0,001
(0.016)
-0,08
(0.017)**
*
-0,042
(0.017)**
Indiaitei ,
-0,023
(0.028)
0,007
(0.031)
0,038
(0.027)
-0,0005
(0.021)
0,03
(0.025)
0,003
(0.021)
0,054
(0.01)***
0,003
(0.011)
0,011
(0.009)
0,001
(0.023)
0,128
(0.026)**
*
0,038
(0.026)
Chinaitei ,
0,034
(0.036)
0,081
(0.038)**
0,065
(0.038)*
-0,058
(0.045)
-0,037
(0.045)
-0,001
(0.045)
0,156
(0.044)**
*
0,069
(0.046)
0,271
(0.043)**
*
0,016
(0.018)
0,023
(0.019)
0,04
(0.019)**
DIG_primary 0,284
(0.162)*
0,499
(0.168)**
*
0,559
(0.168)**
*
-0,22
(0.185)
-0,117
(0.169)
0,507
(0.176)**
*
0,08
(0.174)
0,534
(0.175)**
*
0,263
(0.167)
-0,519
(0.102)**
*
-0,439
(0.113)**
*
-0,554
(0.104)**
*
DIG_processed 0,033
(0.029)
0,089
(0.031)**
*
0,112
(0.031)**
*
0,029
(0.034)
0,068
(0.031)**
0,013
(0.033)
-0,02
(0.033)
0,085
(0.032)**
*
0,031
(0.032)
-0,123
(0.031)**
*
-0,144
(0.032)**
*
-0,057
(0.032)*
BraziliteiprimaryDIG ,*_
0,262
(0.037)**
*
0,03
(0.039)
0,114
(0.035)**
*
-0,079
(0.133)
-0,145
(0.137)
-0,225
(0.122)*
-0,252
(0.135)*
0,149
(0.15)
0,001
(0.117)
-0,022
(0.102)
0,051
(0.115)
-0,082
(0.098)
BraziliteiprocessedDIG ,*_
0,018
(0.015)
0,024
(0.017)
0,042
(0.015)**
*
0,018
(0.027)
0,031
(0.032)
-0,01
(0.028)
0,028
(0.025)
0,001
(0.026)
0,014
(0.024)
-0,023
(0.02)
0,01
(0.021)
-0,016
(0.021)
RussiaiteiprimaryDIG ,*_ -0,114(0.138)
0,002
(0.122)
0,068
(0.116)
0,029
(0.083)
0,107
(0.105)
-0,027
(0.08)
0,138
(0.114)
-0,068
(0.126)
0,053
(0.09)
-0,019
(0.109)
-0,054
(0.122)
-0,018
(0.099)
RussiaiteiprocessedDIG ,*_
0,001
(0.02)
-0,004
(0.022)
0,023
(0.02)
0,009
(0.012)
0,003
(0.015)
-0,008
(0.012)
0,003
(0.011)
0,003
(0.011)
-0,006
(0.01)
-0,031
(0.017)*
0,027
(0.018)
0,024
(0.018)
IndiaiteiprimaryDIG ,*_
0,078
(0.129)
0,271
(0.127)**
0,401
(0.119)**
*
-0,015
(0.106)
0,179
(0.11)
0,396
(0.094)**
*
-0,052
(0.042)
-0,106
(0.043)**
-0,011
(0.036)
-0,161
(0.109)
-0,071
(0.114)
-0,187
(0.105)*
IndiaiteiprocessedDIG ,*_
-0,002
(0.025)
0,001
(0.028)
-0,039
(0.025)
-0,017
(0.019)
-0,014
(0.022)
0,016
(0.019)
-0,003
(0.011)
0,006
(0.012)
0,015
(0.01)
0,032
(0.023)
-0,044
(0.025)*
-0,05
(0.025)**
ChinaiteiprimaryDIG ,*_
-0,059
(0.257)
-0,015
(0.267)
0,05
(0.266)
-0,254
(0.306)
-0,217
(0.285)
0,656
(0.292)**
0,323
(0.295)
0,673
(0.3)**
0,214
(0.28)
0,001
(0.097)
0,236
(0.107)**
0,046
(0.102)
ChinaiteiprocessedDIG ,*_
-0,029
(0.026)
-0,073
(0.027)**
*
-0,06
(0.027)**
-0,051
(0.034)
-0,006
(0.035)
-0,008
(0.034)
0,031
(0.034)
-0,0002
(0.035)
0,025
(0.033)
0,061
(0.023)**
*
0,071
(0.024)**
*
0,057
(0.024)**
R-squared (overall) 0.043 0.032 0.05 0.022 0.022 0.037 0.097 0.047 0.092 0.241 0.141 0.172
N. obs. 27,350 26,462 28,363 27,381 26,462 28,363 27,381 27,350 28,363 27,381 27,350 26,462
Note: 1) * if p-value < 0.10, ** if p-value < 0.05, *** if p-value < 0.01; 2) standard errors in parentheses; 3) prior to estimation all variables have
been standardized; 4) time, sectoral dummies and full set of their interaction terms are included in all models; 5) cells with coefficients which reflect
internal effects of export incentives are marked by light grey color; 6) cells with coefficients used in calculations of backward linkages` effects are
marked by dark grey color.
Inspecting respective sums of the coefficients of the variables reflecting external effects of export
incentives and the coefficients of their interaction terms with dummies for intermediates, we find
evidence on positive backward linkages` effects for several country-pairs. First, we find rather
strong evidence that Indian export incentives stimulate Brazilian export of primary intermediates
to India.  Second, we find rather strong evidence that Chinese export incentives stimulate Russian
export of primary intermediates to China. Finally, we find evidence that Chinese export incentives
stimulate Indian export of primary and processed intermediates to China.
We should note that results for control variables (including direct effects of dummies for
intermediates) are in general similar to those obtained in Table 4, 6, 7 and 8. Other significant
results in Table 9 can be divided into two broad groups – those that concern internal effects of
export incentives and those that concern other than positive backward linkages` external effects of
BRICs export incentives in bilateral trade of the BRICs. As the core focus of this study is on more
aggregate effects, we do not discuss them here.
Next, in order to concretize results according to our framework outlined in Figure 1 we
estimate equation (3) separately for export incentives targeted at final and processed intermediate
goods. Results are presented in Tables 10 and 11.
Table 10 Backward linkages` effect`s test for export incentives targeted at final goods: Random effects panel
data model estimation results
Variable/Model Export from Brazil (X) to Export from Russia (X) to Export from India (X) to Export from China (X) to
Russia
(Y)
India
(Y)
China
(Y)
Brazil
(Y)
India
(Y)
China
(Y)
Brazil
(Y)
Russia
(Y)
China
(Y)
Brazil
(Y)
Russia
(Y)
India
(Y)
Constant -0,116
(0.345)
-0,109
(0.369)
-0,125
(0.366)
-0,157
(0.379)
-0,182
(0.379)
-0,022
(0.379)
-0,505
(0.371)
-0,403
(0.38)
0,069
(0.369)
-0,646
(0.328)**
-0,674
(0.352)*
-0,958
(0.343)**
*
isi
0,004
(0.022)
-0,008
(0.024)
-0,023
(0.023)
0,064
(0.025)**
0,056
(0.024)**
0,048
(0.024)**
-0,212
(0.024)**
*
-0,128
(0.024)**
*
-0,199
(0.023)**
*
0,033
(0.022)
-0,005
(0.024)
-0,018
(0.024)
ici
-0,075
(0.023)**
*
-0,07
(0.025)**
*
-0,104
(0.024)**
*
-0,143
(0.026)**
*
-0,107
(0.024)**
*
-0,108
(0.025)**
*
0,009
(0.024)
-0,005
(0.025)
-0,013
(0.024)
-0,178
(0.023)**
*
-0,123
(0.024)**
*
-0,099
(0.024)**
*
inci
-0,022
(0.013)*
0,004
(0.014)
0,001
(0.013)
0,013
(0.014)
0,043
(0.014)**
*
0,067
(0.014)**
*
-0,019
(0.014)
-0,039
(0.014)**
*
-0,021
(0.014)
-0,053
(0.013)**
*
-0,042
(0.014)**
*
-0,056
(0.014)**
*
Xiniter _,
-0,003
(0.008)
0,011
(0.008)
-0,018
(0.007)**
0,009
(0.008)
0,008
(0.009)
-0,005
(0.007)
-0,004
(0.004)
0,006
(0.004)
-0,002
(0.004)
Yitit ,
0,003
(0.01)
0,005
(0.014)
-0,025
(0.013)**
-0,081
(0.019)**
*
-0,015
(0.014)
-0,053
(0.013)**
*
-0,065
(0.019)**
*
-0,056
(0.012)**
*
-0,037
(0.013)**
*
0,171
(0.016)**
*
0,048
(0.01)***
-0,015
(0.013)
Brazilitei ,
-0,012
(0.012)
-0,014
(0.014)
0,005
(0.013)
-0,025
(0.024)
-0,07
(0.027)**
*
-0,04
(0.023)*
-0,054
(0.025)**
0,022
(0.026)
-0,019
(0.023)
-0,026
(0.017)
0,001
(0.018)
-0,029
(0.018)
Russiaitei ,
-0,00003
(0.01)
-0,009
(0.011)
-0,014
(0.01)
0,007
(0.011)
0,027
(0.013)**
0,004
(0.011)
0,013
(0.01)
0,002
(0.011)
0,004
(0.01)
0,012
(0.008)
-0,02
(0.009)**
-0,015
(0.009)
Indiaitei ,
-0,002
(0.014)
-0,013
(0.017)
0,009
(0.013)
0,013
(0.014)
0,02
(0.017)
-0,002
(0.013)
0,053
(0.01)***
0,004
(0.011)
0,011
(0.009)
-0,009
(0.011)
0,046
(0.013)**
*
0,075
(0.014)**
*
Chinaitei ,
-0,026
(0.032)
0,078
(0.034)**
0,065
(0.033)*
0,031
(0.041)
0,013
(0.042)
0,036
(0.04)
0,058
(0.039)
-0,075
(0.039)*
0,067
(0.038)*
0,012
(0.018)
0,024
(0.019)
0,044
(0.019)**
DIG_primary 0,542
(0.142)**
*
1,036
(0.15)***
0,894
(0.147)**
*
-0,059
(0.165)
0,06
(0.153)
0,67
(0.155)**
*
-0,083
(0.167)
0,721
(0.16)***
0,075
(0.152)
-0,528
(0.117)**
*
-0,416
(0.122)**
*
-0,496
(0.117)**
*
DIG_processed 0,016
(0.033)
0,101
(0.036)**
*
0,132
(0.035)**
*
0,047
(0.037)
0,052
(0.034)
0,014
(0.036)
-0,03
(0.035)
0,049
(0.035)
0,04
(0.035)
-0,141
(0.033)**
*
-0,138
(0.035)**
*
-0,016
(0.034)
BraziliteiprimaryDIG ,*_
0,262
(0.037)**
*
0,019
(0.039)
0,104
(0.035)**
*
0,078
(0.153)
0,353
(0.167)
-0,005
(0.14)
0,063
(0.143)
0,347
(0.154)**
0,172
(0.13)
0,042
(0.128)
0,049
(0.14)
-0,099
(0.138)
BraziliteiprocessedDIG ,*_
0,019
(0.015)
0,023
(0.016)
0,037
(0.015)**
0,002
(0.032)
-0,011
(0.036)
0,001
(0.032)
0,02
(0.03)
-0,004
(0.031)
0,012
(0.028)
-0,041
(0.022)*
-0,026
(0.023)
-0,059
(0.023)**
*
RussiaiteiprimaryDIG ,*_ -0,263(0.228)
2,019
(0.248)**
*
1,001
(0.233)**
*
0,026
(0.083)
0,096
(0.105)
-0,036
(0.08)
-0,44
(0.309)
1,902
(0.251)**
*
-0,08
(0.228)
0,058
(0.238)
-0,051
(0.197)
-0,101
(0.198)
RussiaiteiprocessedDIG ,*_ 0,005(0.017)
0,008
(0.019)
0,009
(0.018)
0,0002
(0.012)
-0,006
(0.013)
-0,007
(0.012)
-0,002
(0.011)
-0,005
(0.011)
-0,001
(0.01)
-0,019
(0.015)
0,014
(0.015)
-0,03
(0.015)**
IndiaiteiprimaryDIG ,*_
0,253
(0.149)*
-0,076
(0.153)
0,392
(0.144)**
*
-0,136
(0.163)
0,148
(0.177)
0,307
(0.15)**
-0,042
(0.041)
-0,156
(0.042)**
*
-0,006
(0.035)
-0,309
(0.132)**
-0,034
(0.136)
-0,057
(0.13)
IndiaiteiprocessedDIG ,*_
-0,015
(0.033)
-0,023
(0.035)
-0,032
(0.034)
0,007
(0.027)
0,013
(0.031)
0,018
(0.027)
-0,0005
(0.01)
0,009
(0.011)
0,014
(0.01)
0,034
(0.03)
-0,024
(0.032)
0,052
(0.031)*
ChinaiteiprimaryDIG ,*_
0,335
(0.214)
0,321
(0.226)
0,233
(0.22)
-0,069
(0.248)
-0,307
(0.228)
0,813
(0.232)**
*
0,029
(0.232)
0,086
(0.23)
-0,222
(0.219)
0,017
(0.098)
0,234
(0.109)**
0,036
(0.103)
ChinaiteiprocessedDIG ,*_ -0,015(0.029)
-0,054
(0.031)*
-0,067
(0.031)**
-0,049
(0.039)
0,027
(0.04)
-0,033
(0.039)
0,023
(0.039)
0,008
(0.04)
-0,022
(0.038)
0,067
(0.023)**
*
0,078
(0.025)**
*
0,051
(0.024)**
R-squared (overall) 0.044 0.033 0.052 0.02 0.023 0.038 0.093 0.047 0.084 0.243 0.138 0.172
N. obs. 27,350 26,462 28,363 27,381 26,462 28,363 27,381 27,350 28,363 27,381 27,350 26,462
Note: 1) * if p-value < 0.10, ** if p-value < 0.05, *** if p-value < 0.01; 2) standard errors in parentheses; 3) prior to estimation all variables have
been standardized; 4) time, sectoral dummies and full set of their interaction terms are included in all models; 5) cells with coefficients which reflect
internal effects of export incentives are marked by light grey color; 6) cells with coefficients used in calculations of backward linkages` effects are
marked by dark grey color.
Table 11 Backward linkages` effect`s test for export incentives targeted at processed intermediates: Random
effects panel data model estimation results
Variable/Model Export from Brazil (X) to Export from Russia (X) to Export from India (X) to Export from China (X) to
Russia
(Y)
India
(Y)
China
(Y)
Brazil
(Y)
India
(Y)
China
(Y)
Brazil
(Y)
Russia
(Y)
China
(Y)
Brazil
(Y)
Russia
(Y)
India
(Y)
Constant -0,079
(0.347)
-0,104
(0.369)
-0,125
(0.367)
-0,26
(0.379)
-0,181
(0.38)
-0,064
(0.381)
-0,501
(0.371)
-0,298
(0.381)
0,108
(0.367)
-0,512
(0.326)
-0,594
(0.349)*
-0,843
(0.342)**
isi
0,005
(0.022)
-0,008
(0.024)
-0,023
(0.023)
0,059
(0.025)**
0,057
(0.024)**
0,047
(0.024)*
-0,206
(0.024)**
*
-0,123
(0.024)**
*
-0,189
(0.023)**
*
0,033
(0.022)
0,001
(0.024)
-0,014
(0.023)
ici
-0,076
(0.023)**
*
-0,067
(0.025)**
*
-0,101
(0.024)**
*
-0,135
(0.025)**
*
-0,111
(0.024)**
*
-0,104
(0.025)**
*
-0,004
(0.024)
-0,011
(0.025)
-0,033
(0.024)
-0,18
(0.022)**
*
-0,132
(0.024)**
*
-0,109
(0.024)**
*
inci
-0,022
(0.013)*
0,003
(0.014)
-0,001
(0.014)
0,009
(0.014)
0,039
(0.014)**
*
0,066
(0.014)**
*
-0,015
(0.014)
-0,04
(0.014)**
*
-0,015
(0.013)
-0,052
(0.013)**
*
-0,041
(0.014)**
*
-0,056
(0.014)**
*
Xiniter _,
-0,001
(0.008)
0,014
(0.008)*
-0,013
(0.007)*
0,008
(0.008)
0,008
(0.009)
-0,005
(0.007)
-0,004
(0.004)
0,006
(0.004)
-0,001
(0.004)
Yitit ,
0,005
(0.01)
0,006
(0.014)
-0,023
(0.013)*
-0,092
(0.019)**
*
-0,015
(0.014)
-0,053
(0.013)**
*
-0,052
(0.018)**
*
-0,052
(0.012)**
*
-0,031
(0.013)**
0,17
(0.016)**
*
0,043
(0.01)***
-0,016
(0.012)
Brazilitei ,
-0,012
(0.012)
-0,016
(0.014)
0,008
(0.012)
-0,073
(0.043)*
-0,016
(0.048)
-0,028
(0.043)
-0,036
(0.042)
-0,0003
(0.044)
-0,039
(0.04)
0,127
(0.032)**
*
0,073
(0.033)**
0,125
(0.033)**
*
Russiaitei ,
0,009
(0.022)
-0,009
(0.024)
0,008
(0.023)
0,009
(0.01)
0,02
(0.012)
0,005
(0.01)
0,004
(0.015)
0,024
(0.016)
-0,008
(0.014)
0,003
(0.019)
0,007
(0.02)
0,004
(0.019)
Indiaitei ,
-0,014
(0.034)
-0,0002
(0.037)
0,002
(0.035)
-0,02
(0.023)
0,01
(0.027)
-0,0001
(0.024)
0,056
(0.01)***
0,004
(0.011)
0,014
(0.01)
0,035
(0.03)
0,025
(0.031)
-0,022
(0.031)
Chinaitei ,
0,028
(0.042)
0,082
(0.045)*
0,043
(0.045)
-0,005
(0.053)
-0,02
(0.053)
-0,013
(0.053)
0,049
(0.052)
0,063
(0.053)
0,142
(0.051)**
*
0,004
(0.018)
0,013
(0.019)
0,034
(0.019)*
DIG_primary 0,142
(0.103)
0,398
(0.103)**
*
0,273
(0.103)**
*
-0,14
(0.118)
-0,058
(0.106)
0,295
(0.109)**
*
-0,018
(0.11)
0,255
(0.111)**
0,172
(0.102)*
-0,586
(0.094)**
*
-0,572
(0.104)**
*
-0,592
(0.097)**
*
DIG_processed 0,025
(0.031)
0,055
(0.033)*
0,082
(0.033)**
0,063
(0.036)*
0,079
(0.034)**
0,025
(0.035)
-0,025
(0.035)
0,06
(0.035)*
-0,005
(0.034)
-0,188
(0.033)**
*
-0,208
(0.035)**
*
-0,107
(0.034)**
*
BraziliteiprimaryDIG ,*_ 0,26(0.037)**
*
0,036
(0.039)
0,116
(0.035)**
*
0,075
(0.102)
-0,033
(0.102)
-0,195
(0.094)**
-0,185
(0.098)*
-0,103
(0.113)
-0,06
(0.085)
-0,129
(0.075)*
-0,091
(0.088)
-0,182
(0.072)**
BraziliteiprocessedDIG ,*_ 0,017(0.015)
0,025
(0.016)
0,034
(0.015)**
0,061
(0.042)
0,034
(0.048)
-0,008
(0.043)
0,04
(0.041)
0,006
(0.043)
0,044
(0.039)
-0,092
(0.032)**
*
-0,026
(0.034)
-0,095
(0.033)**
*
RussiaiteiprimaryDIG ,*_ -0,012(0.057)
0,022
(0.049)
-0,048
(0.048)
0,024
(0.083)
0,102
(0.105)
-0,033
(0.08)
0,069
(0.038)*
-0,038
(0.046)
0,035
(0.031)
0,036
(0.045)
0,027
(0.05)
0,006
(0.04)
RussiaiteiprocessedDIG ,*_
-0,003
(0.021)
-0,009
(0.022)
-0,003
(0.022)
0,001
(0.01)
0,004
(0.012)
-0,005
(0.01)
0,016
(0.013)
0,005
(0.014)
0,0003
(0.013)
-0,008
(0.018)
-0,016
(0.018)
-0,008
(0.018)
IndiaiteiprimaryDIG ,*_ 0,005(0.104)
0,044
(0.094)
0,27
(0.093)**
*
-0,009
(0.074)
0,037
(0.074)
0,239
(0.066)**
*
-0,054
(0.042)
-0,09
(0.043)**
-0,012
(0.036)
-0,197
(0.094)**
-0,158
(0.098)
-0,122
(0.082)
IndiaiteiprocessedDIG ,*_
0,006
(0.034)
0,005
(0.036)
-0,005
(0.035)
-0,001
(0.024)
-0,018
(0.027)
0,015
(0.024)
-0,012
(0.011)
-0,0005
(0.012)
0,009
(0.01)
-0,02
(0.03)
-0,007
(0.031)
-0,006
(0.031)
ChinaiteiprimaryDIG ,*_ -0,284(0.155)*
0,043
(0.155)
-0,218
(0.154)
-0,285
(0.19)
-0,145
(0.175)
0,434
(0.177)**
0,123
(0.186)
0,468
(0.192)**
0,174
(0.171)
0,002
(0.096)
0,25
(0.107)**
0,036
(0.101)
ChinaiteiprocessedDIG ,*_ -0,032(0.041)
-0,091
(0.044)**
-0,056
(0.044)
-0,055
(0.051)
-0,024
(0.051)
0,007
(0.051)
0,038
(0.05)
-0,022
(0.052)
0,003
(0.05)
0,069
(0.023)**
*
0,079
(0.024)**
*
0,059
(0.024)**
R-squared (overall) 0.043 0.032 0.049 0.023 0.022 0.037 0.097 0.048 0.093 0.247 0.144 0.175
N. obs. 27,350 26,462 28,363 27,381 26,462 28,363 27,381 27,350 28,363 27,381 27,350 26,462
Note: 1) * if p-value < 0.10, ** if p-value < 0.05, *** if p-value < 0.01; 2) standard errors in parentheses; 3) prior to estimation all variables have
been standardized; 4) time, sectoral dummies and full set of their interaction terms are included in all models; 5) cells with coefficients which reflect
internal effects of export incentives are marked by light grey color; 6) cells with coefficients used in calculations of backward linkages` effects are
marked by dark grey color.
For the first case of positive backward linkages` effects found in Table 9, i.e. that Indian export
incentives stimulate Brazilian export of primary intermediates to India, there is some evidence
(albeit not statistically significant) that these effects come from Indian export incentives targeted
at processed intermediates. For the second case, i.e. that Chinese export incentives stimulate
Russian export of primary intermediates to China, we find rather convincing evidence that these
effects come from Chinese export incentives targeted at processed intermediates. Finally, for the
third case, i.e. that Chinese export incentives stimulate Indian export of primary and processed
intermediates to China, we find that most of these effects come from Chinese export incentives
targeted at processed intermediates to Indian export of primary intermediates to China.
In addition, we find rather strong evidence that Russian export incentives targeted at final
goods stimulate Indian export of primary intermediates to Russia. There is also evidence that
Indian export incentives targeted at final goods stimulate Chinese export of intermediates to India
(this effect seems to be stronger for Chinese export of processed than primary intermediates).
Finally, there is evidence that Chinese export incentives targeted at final goods enhance Brazilian
export of primary intermediates to China.
5.3. Results` discussion
For illustrative purposes, we summarize our results in Tables 12-15 below. Negative effects are
marked by red color and positive – by blue color. We must note that we distinguish between
positive and negative effects if they are rather obvious. Otherwise, respective cells are empty.
Table 12 External effects of all export incentives implemented in one BRIC country on total export of other
three BRIC countries (results for equation (1) in Table 4)
Brazilian total export Russian total export Indian total export Chinese total export
Brazilian export incentives
Russian export incentives -
Indian export incentives -
Chinese export incentives - +
Table 13 External effects of export incentives implemented in one BRIC country on total export of other three
BRIC countries by type of good targeted by incentive (results for equation (1) in Tables 6-8)
Brazilian total export Russian total export Indian total export Chinese total export
Brazilian export
incentives targeted at
final goods
- -
Russian export incentives
targeted at final goods
Indian export incentives
targeted at final goods
-
Chinese export incentives
targeted at final goods
Brazilian export
incentives targeted at
primary intermediates
-
Russian export incentives
targeted at primary
intermediates
-
Indian export incentives
targeted at primary
intermediates
Chinese export incentives
targeted at primary
intermediates
+
Brazilian export
incentives targeted at
processed intermediates
Russian export incentives
targeted at processed
intermediates
Indian export incentives
targeted at processed
intermediates
- +
Chinese export incentives
targeted at processed
intermediates
- +
Table 14 External effects of all export incentives implemented in one BRIC country on export of different
types of goods of other three BRIC countries (results for equation (2) in Table 4)
Brazilia
n export
of final
goods
Russia
n
export
of final
goods
India
n
expor
t of
final
good
s
Chines
e
export
of final
goods
Brazilian
export of
primary
intermediat
es
Russian
export of
primary
intermediat
es
Indian
export of
primary
intermediat
es
Chinese
export of
primary
intermediat
es
Brazilian
export of
processed
intermediat
es
Russian
export of
processed
intermediat
es
Indian
export of
processed
intermediat
es
Chinese
export of
processed
intermediat
es
Brazilian
export
incentive
s
- + -
Russian
export
incentive
s
- -
Indian
export
incentive
s
- - +
Chinese
export
incentive
s
+ + - - +
Table 15 External effects of export incentives implemented in one country on export of different types of goods
of other three BRIC countries  by type of good targeted by incentive (results for equation (2) in Tables 6-8)
Brazilian
export of
final goods
Russian
export of
final
goods
Indian
export of
final
goods
Chinese
export of
final
goods
Brazilian
export of
primary
intermediates
Russian
export of
primary
intermediates
Indian export
of primary
intermediates
Chinese
export of
primary
intermediates
Brazilian
export of
processed
intermediates
Russian
export of
processed
intermediates
Indian export
of processed
intermediates
Chinese
export of
processed
intermediates
Brazilian
export
incentives
targeted at
final goods
- - + - -
Russian
export
incentives
targeted at
final goods
+ - -
Indian export
incentives
targeted at
final goods
- - +
Chinese
export
incentives
targeted at
final goods
+ + + - - +
Brazilian
export
incentives
targeted at
primary
intermediates
+
Russian
export
incentives
targeted at
primary
intermediates
+ -
Indian export
incentives
targeted at
primary
intermediates
- + -
Chinese
export
incentives
targeted at
primary
intermediates
+ - + +
Brazilian
export
incentives
targeted at
processed
intermediates
+ - +
Russian
export
incentives
targeted at
processed
intermediates
Indian export
incentives
targeted at
processed
intermediates
+ +
Chinese
export
incentives
targeted at
processed
intermediates
+ -
First thing, which strikes the eye is that negative effects dominate on more aggregate levels (Tables
12-14). This suggests that even in the world of GVCs export incentives tend to be more harmful
than beneficial for foreign countries` exports.  Furthermore, all positive effects on aggregate levels
in Tables 12-14 with exception of one (positive effects coming from Brazilian export incentives
to Russian export of processed intermediates in Table 14) arise between China and India.
From Table 15 we can make several conclusions. First, main “receivers” of positive
external effects of export incentives implemented in other three BRICs countries seem to be India
and China while the main “giver” is China. Second, Russia and China seem to be hurt by export
incentives implemented in other BRICs a bit more often than India and Brazil. Third, Brazilian,
Indian and Chinese export incentives targeted at final goods are all harmful for Russian export of
processed intermediates.  According to our framework, this indicates that indirect negative
backward linkages` “competition for market share” effects dominate here. In particular, our study
suggests that in general “BIC” export incentives targeted at domestic final goods have positive
spillover effects for processed intermediates in the same two-digit industries as targeted final
goods, which in turn hurt Russian producers/exporters of the same intermediates. Forth, Brazil
gets positive external effects only from Russian export incentives while all negative effects come
from China and India. China gets most positive effects from Indian export incentives while
negative effects come from Brazil, India and China. India gets most positive effects from China
but also some positive effects come from Brazil while few negative effects come from Brazil and
Russia but not from China. Finally, Russia seems to be rather equally affected by Brazilian, Indian
and Chinese export incentives both on positive and negative sides.
In Table 16 we summarize positive backward linkages effects` results found in Tables 9-
11.
Table 16 Summary of positive backward linkages` effects
Brazilian export of
primary
intermediates
Russian export of
primary
intermediates
Indian export of
primary
intermediates
Chinese export of
primary
intermediates
Brazilian export of
processed
intermediates
Russian export of
processed
intermediates
Indian export of
processed
intermediates
Chinese export of
processed
intermediates
Brazilian export
incentives
Russian export
incentives
Indian export
incentives
Chinese export
incentives
Brazilian export
incentives targeted
at final goods
Russian export
incentives targeted
at final goods
Indian export
incentives targeted
at final goods
Chinese export
incentives targeted
at final goods
Brazilian export
incentives targeted
at processed
intermediates
Russian export
incentives targeted
at processed
intermediates
Indian export
incentives targeted
at processed
intermediates
Chinese export
incentives targeted
at processed
intermediates
As we can see from the summary table, positive backward linkages` effects mainly emerge for
export of primary intermediates. However, for China-India trade they also emerge for processed
intermediates.
6. CONCLUSIONS
Whereas much attention has been devoted to the effects of export incentives on domestic export,
we argue in this paper for the need to investigate effects of domestic export incentives on foreign
exports. It is reasonable to think that export promotion measures implemented in a country
positively affect its export and negatively – its foreign rivals` export. This study argues that in
GVCs world effects of domestic export promotion policies on foreign exports can be negative or
positive alike. For empirical test of this proposition, we explicitly study the effects of export
incentives implemented in one of the BRIC countries on exports of the other three BRICs.
Empirical results reveal that while BRICs export incentives positively affect domestic exports,
their external effects for each other’s` export can be both positive and negative. According to our
study, positive effects emerge due to backward and forward linkages inside GVCs via trade in
intermediates.
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APPENDICES
Appendix 1 Industrial breakdown of BRICs export incentives based on Global Trade Alert (GTA)
data
Table A1.1 Industrial structure (two-digit HS 2007) of export incentives implemented in Brazil in 2009-2014
(by number of affected tariff lines (four-digit HS as reported in GTA database) including repetitions): top 10
industries
Industry Number of affected tariff lines
including repetitions
% from
total
1 (84) Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances; parts thereof 281 9,43
2 (85) Electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof; sound recorders and reproducers, television image and
sound recorders and reproducers, and parts and accessories of such articles
182 6,11
3 (29) Organic chemicals 134 4,50
4 (39) Plastics and articles thereof 118 3,96
5 (28) Inorganic chemicals; organic or inorganic compounds of precious metals, of rare-earth metals, of radioactive elements
or of isotopes
108 3,62
6 (72) Iron and steel 94 3,15
7 (73) Articles of iron and steel 80 2,68
8 (90) Optical, photographic, cinematographic, measuring, checking, precision, medical or surgical instruments and
apparatus; parts and accessories thereof
79 2,65
9 (38) Miscellaneous chemical products 78 2,62
10 (48) Paper and paperboard; articles of paper pulp, of paper or of paperboard. 76 2,55
Total in top 10 1230 41,28
Table A1.2 Industrial structure (two-digit HS 2007) of export incentives implemented in Russia in 2009-2014
(by number of affected tariff lines (four-digit HS as reported in GTA database) including repetitions): top 10
industries
Industry Number of affected tariff lines
including repetitions
% from
total
1 (84) Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances; parts thereof. 86 24,29
2 (85) Electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof; sound recorders and reproducers, television image and
sound recorders and reproducers, and parts and accessories of such articles.
42 11,86
3 (90) Optical, photographic, cinematographic, measuring, checking, precision, medical or surgical instruments and
apparatus; parts and accessories thereof.
27 7,63
4 (72) Iron and steel. 26 7,34
5 (73) Articles of iron and steel. 25 7,06
6 (39) Plastics and articles thereof. 20 5,65
7 (87) Vehicles other than railway or tramway rolling-stock, and parts and accessories thereof. 15 4,24
8 (40) Rubber and articles thereof. 10 2,82
9 (76) Aluminium and articles thereof. 9 2,54
10 (69) Ceramic products. 8 2,26
Total in top 10 268 75.7
Table A1.3 Industrial structure (two-digit HS 2007) of export incentives implemented in India in 2009-2014 (by
number of affected tariff lines (four-digit HS as reported in GTA database) including repetitions): top 10
industries
Industry Number of affected tariff lines
including repetitions
% from
total
1 (84) Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances; parts thereof 571 10,75
2 (85) Electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof; sound recorders and reproducers, television image and
sound recorders and reproducers, and parts and accessories of such articles
363
6,83
3 (61) Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, knitted or crocheted (Textile section) 263 4,95
4 (62) Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, not knitted or crocheted (Textile section) 260 4,90
5 (28) Inorganic chemicals; organic or inorganic compounds of precious metals, of rare-earth metals, of radioactive elements
or of isotopes
216
4,07
6 (29) Organic chemicals 203 3,82
7 (73) Articles of iron or steel 179 3,37
8 (90) Optical, photographic, cinematographic, measuring, checking, precision, medical or surgical instruments and
apparatus; parts and accessories thereof
160
3,01
9 (72) Iron and steel 125 2,35
10 (52) Cotton 113 2,13
Total in top 10 2453 46,19
Table A1.4 Industrial structure (two-digit HS 2007) of export incentives implemented in China in 2009-2014
(by number of affected tariff lines (four-digit HS as reported in GTA database) including repetitions): top 10
industries
Industry Number of affected tariff lines
including repetitions
% from
total
1 (84) Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances; parts thereof 155 14,95
2 (85) Electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof; sound recorders and reproducers, television image and
sound recorders and reproducers, and parts and accessories of such articles
100 9,64
3 (29) Organic chemicals 65 6,27
4 (90) Optical, photographic, cinematographic, measuring, checking, precision, medical or surgical instruments and
apparatus; parts and accessories thereof
54 5,21
5 (39) Plastics and articles thereof. 36 3,47
6 (70) Glass and glassware. 29 2,80
7 (87) Vehicles other than railway or tramway rolling-stock, and parts and accessories thereof. 27 2,60
8 (73) Articles of iron or steel 21 2,03
9 (52) Cotton. 20 1,93
10 (44) Wood and articles of wood; wood charcoal. 19 1,83
Total in top 10 526 50,72
Note: Industries, which are in top 10 for all BRICs are marked by bold.
Source: Author`s computations based on GTA data; data accessed on 20.06.2016.
Appendix 2 BEC structure of intermediate goods` export of the BRICs in 1995-2015
Figure A2.1. Brazilian export of intermediate goods: BEC structure, million USD
Figure A2.2. Russian export of intermediate goods: BEC structure, million USD
Figure A2.3. Indian export of intermediate goods: BEC structure, million USD
Figure A2.4. Chinese export of intermediate goods: BEC structure, million USD
Source: UN COMTRADE
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Appendix 3 BEC structure of intermediate goods` export in inter-BRICs trade in 1995-2015
Figure A3.1 Brazilian export of intermediate goods to Russia: BEC structure, million USD
Figure A3.2 Brazilian export of intermediate goods to India: BEC structure, million USD
Source: UN COMTRADE
Figure A3.3 Brazilian export of intermediate goods to China: BEC structure, million USD
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Figure A3.4 Russian export of intermediate goods to Brazil: BEC structure, million USD
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Figure A3.6 Russian export of intermediate goods to China: BEC structure, million USD
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Figure A3.7 Indian export of intermediate goods to Brazil: BEC structure, million USD
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Figure A3.9 Indian export of intermediate goods to China: BEC structure, million USD
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Figure A3.10 Chinese export of intermediate goods to Brazil: BEC structure, million USD
Figure A3.11 Chinese export of intermediate goods to Russia: BEC structure, million USD
Figure A3.12 Chinese export of intermediate goods to India: BEC structure, million USD
Source: UN COMTRADE
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Appendix 4 UNCTAD computation strategy of the factor intensity indices
The revealed factor intensity indices for each traded good were calculated as a weighted average
of factor abundance of 94 countries exporting that good, with a variant of Balassa’s Revealed
Comparative Advantage (RCA) indices as weights.
The Revealed Capital Intensity Index, RCI of good i is calculated as:
c
c
c
c
iii L
KciRCI å== v      (A1),
where cK is country`s c capital stock, cL is its labor force, and civ  is a variant of Balassa`s RCA
for country c in good i. For RCI`s computation, capital stock estimates have been reconstructed
from investment flows by adding up, recursively, current investment to the previous period’s
capital stock, appropriately depreciated. In particular, Easterly and Levine (2001) capital stock
estimates have been replicated using the updated version 6.2 of the Penn World Table which
provides aggregate investment figures for 159 countries.
The Revealed Human Capital Intensity Index, RHCI, of a good i is given by:
c
c
c
iii hsiRHCI å== v     (A2),
where ch is the average years of schooling achieved by the average person. The RHCI is based on
Barro and Lee (2001) estimates of educational attainment rates for 105 countries at five-year
intervals from 1960 to 2004 for different levels of education for overall populations aged over 15
and over 25, respectively. Both isi  and iki  are for HS 4-digit industry.
The Revealed Natural Resource Intensity Index, RNRI, of a good i is calculated as:
c
c
c
ii nrRNRI å= v    (A3),
where cnr is natural resource capital per person. To measure the natural resource endowment in a
country, UNCTAD researchers used two alternative data sources. First indicator is arable land
taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI). Second indicator is taken
from the database on natural resource capital from the World Bank’s volumes “Expanding the
Measure of Wealth” (1997) and “Where is the Wealth of Nations?” (2006). The database covers
only two years (1994 and 2000) and provides with the most complete measure of natural resource
endowments to date. Natural resource capital in the database consists of non-renewable resources
(subsoil assets, including oil, natural gas, coal, and mineral resources), cropland, pastureland,
forested areas (including areas used for timber extraction and non-timber forest products), and
protected areas. In this study we use the RNRI computed using natural resource capital database
(i.e. second alternative).
Appendix 5 Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix of variables in baseline estimations
Table 5.1. Descriptive statistics
Variable N. obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Dependent variables
es (it,Brazil) 30 184 0,00 1,00 -0,25 14,61
es (it,Russia) 30 184 0,00 1,00 -0,26 15,44
es (it, India) 30 184 0,00 1,00 -0,39 7,91
es (it, China) 30 184 0,00 1,00 -0,93 3,02
Explanatory variables
si (it) 30 300 0,00 1,00 -4,08 2,47
ci (it) 30 300 0,00 1,00 -2,05 2,80
nci (it) 30 294 0,00 1,00 -1,60 9,84
er (it, Russia) 30 300 0,00 1,00 -0,12 20,07
er (it, India) 30 300 0,00 1,00 -0,07 43,79
er (it, China) 30 300 0,00 1,00 -0,11 13,50
ei (it, Brazil), two-digit 30 300 0,00 1,00 -0,93 2,99
ei (it, Russia),  two-digit 30 300 0,00 1,00 -0,30 4,85
ei (it, India), two-digit 30 300 0,00 1,00 -0,66 4,12
ei (it, China), two-digit 30 300 0,00 1,00 -0,74 2,58
Note: Descriptive statistics is reported for standardized variables.
Table 5.2. Correlation matrix
es (it,br) es (it,ru) es (it, in) es (it, ch) si (it) ci (it) nci (it) er (it, ru) er (it, in) er (it, ch) ei (it, br) ei (it, ru) ei (it, in) ei (it, ch)
es (it,br)
1,00
es (it,ru) 0,02 1,00
es (it, in) -0,01 -0,03 1,00
es (it, ch) -0,12 -0,12 -0,07 1,00
si (it) -0,11 0,01 -0,30 -0,27 1,00
ci (it) -0,15 -0,04 -0,25 -0,29 0,85 1,00
nci (it) -0,02 0,12 -0,14 -0,23 0,40 0,34 1,00
er (it, ru) 0,02 0,10 0,00 -0,08 -0,04 -0,04 0,06 1,00
er (it, in) 0,14 0,02 0,00 -0,03 -0,07 -0,07 -0,01 -0,01 1,00
er (it, ch) 0,02 0,10 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,01 0,02 0,00 -0,01 1,00
ei (it, br) -0,05 -0,03 -0,09 -0,07 0,30 0,36 0,05 -0,03 -0,03 -0,01 1,00
ei (it, ru) -0,03 -0,02 -0,06 -0,02 0,14 0,17 0,02 -0,02 -0,02 -0,02 0,58 1,00
ei (it, in) -0,07 -0,04 -0,03 0,08 0,12 0,16 -0,04 -0,04 -0,03 -0,02 0,74 0,86 1,00
ei (it, ch) -0,07 -0,08 -0,09 -0,03 0,28 0,35 0,01 -0,05 -0,05 -0,06 0,89 0,49 0,64 1,00
Note:1) br denotes Brazil; ru denotes Russia; in denotes India; ch denotes China; 2) correlation coefficients higher than 0.5 are denoted by bold.
Table 5.3. Correlation matrix of export incentives` variable disaggregated at two- and four-digit levels
ei (it, Brazil),
four-digit
ei (it, Russia),
four-digit
ei (it, India),
four-digit
ei (it, China),
four-digit
ei (it, Brazil),
two-digit
ei (it, Russia),
two-digit
ei (it, India),
two-digit
ei (it, China),
two-digit
ei (it, Brazil), four-
digit
1,00
ei (it, Russia),  four-
digit
0,20 1,00
ei (it, India), four-
digit
0,24 0,40 1,00
ei (it, China), four-
digit
0,18 0,18 0,21 1,00
ei (it, Brazil), two-
digit
0,29 0,35 0,12 0,35 1,00
ei (it, Russia),  two-
digit
0,15 0,75 0,33 0,19 0,58 1,00
ei (it, India), two-digit 0,21 0,61 0,53 0,28 0,74 0,86 1,00
ei (it, China), two-
digit
0,15 0,27 0,08 0,46 0,89 0,49 0,64 1,00
Note: Correlation coefficients higher than 0.5 are denoted by bold.
